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ABSTRACT 
  This paper is the first empirical analysis of appeal waivers—
clauses in plea agreements by which defendants waive their rights to 
appellate and postconviction review. Based on interviews and an 
analysis of data coded from 971 randomly selected cases sentenced 
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the study’s findings 
include (1) in nearly two-thirds of the cases settled by plea agreement, 
the defendants waived their rights to review; (2) the frequency of 
waiver varies substantially among the circuits, and among districts 
within circuits; (3) the government appears to provide some 
sentencing concessions more frequently to defendants who sign 
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waivers than to defendants who do not, including agreeing to “C” 
pleas (binding sentencing terms), downward departures, safety-valve 
credits, and a variety of stipulations; (4) many defendants who waive 
their rights to review obtain clauses in their agreements that limit their 
exposure to unexpected negative results at sentencing; (5) some 
defendants appear to receive neither greater certainty nor leniency in 
return for signing wide-open and unlimited waivers of their rights to 
review; (6) three-quarters of the defendants who waived appeal also 
waived collateral review, and of these, fewer than one-third preserved 
the right to raise a claim of ineffective assistance; and (7) waivers have 
been enforced to bar a variety of claims, including claims of 
ineffective assistance at sentencing and assertions of constitutional 
violations under Blakely and Booker. The observed trend of 
increased use of stipulations combined with no review raises the risk 
that sentences not in compliance with the law can proliferate without 
scrutiny. The uneven practice of trading sentencing concessions for 
waivers among cases and courts also suggests that waivers are 
undercutting efforts to advance consistency in federal sentencing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Blakely v. 
Washington1 and United States v. Booker2 have disrupted presumptive 
 
 1. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).  
 2. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
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sentencing systems in the federal courts and in several states, 
prompting a level of activity in sentencing reform that this country 
has not seen for three decades. As new sentencing policy takes shape, 
information about the successes and failures of various sentencing 
practices will be in demand. One particular practice—appellate 
review—is likely to remain a popular means of advancing sentencing 
consistency.3 This Article examines one potential limitation of 
appellate review as a means of regulating sentencing: clauses in plea 
agreements by which defendants waive their rights to appellate and 
postconviction review of sentencing errors, known as appeal waivers. 
For well over a decade, anecdotal evidence has suggested that 
appeal waivers have become increasingly frequent in federal cases. 
Scholars and litigants disagree about what is waived, by whom, at 
what price, and how often. In every circuit, litigation challenging the 
enforcement of appeal waivers has raised conflicting claims about 
their drawbacks and benefits. Recent decisions embracing broad 
appeal waivers have continued to provoke criticism from 
commentators.4 And the Supreme Court has yet to rule on their 
validity. Yet despite this sustained controversy, in the seventeen-year 
history of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), no 
empirical examination of sentencing appeal waivers in federal cases 
has ever been conducted. Our study was undertaken to present a 
snapshot of the use and impact of appeal waivers in cases sentenced 
under the Guidelines in the hope that the findings will prompt further 
research and better inform evolving sentencing policy. 
 
 3. See, e.g., Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 767 (noting that Congress strongly favors the “retention 
of sentencing appeals” to “iron out sentencing differences”); Implications of the Booker/Fanfan 
Decision for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., House Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14 (2005) 
(statement of the Honorable Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter Wray], available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi? dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=98624 (“A rigorous and consistent 
appellate standard is essential to any guideline system since appellate review will be an 
important means for the parties to obtain consistent sentencing.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Sentencing Law and Policy, Appeal Waivers in the Wake of Booker, 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2005/04/appeal_waivers_.html (Apr. 
27, 2005, 17:17 EST) (“[I]t is against public policy to let prosecutors and defendants completely 
opt-out of appellate review. . . . [D]istrict courts post-Booker should reconsider the 
appropriateness of accepting pleas with broad appeal waivers.”); see also Spann v. State, 704 
N.W.2d 486, 494–95 (Minn. 2005) (refusing to uphold a waiver of appeal rights in a posttrial 
agreement, noting that “[a]llowing a defendant to waive his right to appeal creates a system that 
discourages the development of the law, permits the results of unfair trials to be preserved, and 
may encourage prosecutors and courts to hide their errors”). 
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To collect basic information about appeal waiver practice in 
federal felony cases, we turned to two sources. First, we conducted 
open-ended interviews of twenty-two defense attorneys and nine 
prosecutors in thirteen different districts.5 The districts were selected 
to represent every circuit, as well as small, medium, and large 
caseloads. They also include some “border districts,” where 
bargaining practices reportedly differ from other districts in certain 
types of cases. Second, with the cooperation of the United States 
Sentencing Commission (Commission), we coded information from 
971 cases randomly selected from among those sentenced in fiscal 
year 2003 (FY 2003) with written plea agreements.6 
In brief, our most important findings demonstrate the following: 
the rate at which plea-based sentences are appealed declined 
somewhat over the period between the adoption of sentencing appeal 
waivers (in the early- to mid-1990s) and 2003. In nearly two-thirds of 
the cases settled by plea agreement in our sample, the defendant 
waived his right to review. The frequency of waivers varies 
substantially among the circuits, and among districts within circuits. 
Immigration cases in our sample were more likely to contain waivers 
than drug trafficking cases, and both were more likely to contain 
waivers than firearms cases. 
The United States rarely waived its rights to appeal; usually only 
the defendant waived his review rights. In the plea agreements we 
examined, the government appears to have provided some sentencing 
concessions more frequently to those defendants who signed waivers 
than to those who did not. These concessions included “C pleas,”7 
downward departures,8 safety-valve credits,9 and a variety of 
stipulations to facts that determined sentences under the 
 
 5. Our interviewees are identified only by role (defender or prosecutor); to protect 
confidentiality, districts and other identifying information are not provided. Professor King 
conducted the interviews between August 2004 and May 2005 by telephone, and each lasted 
about thirty minutes. A sample of the open-ended questions posed to each interviewee is on file 
with the Duke Law Journal. 
 6. We originally selected 1,000 cases from among those coded by the Commission as 
including a written agreement of some sort in the file. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
Cases with no written plea agreements were omitted. Once the coding of the agreements was 
complete, we combined the data that we coded from our sample cases with other information 
about these cases that was included in the Commission’s FY 2003 data. 
 7. A C plea is a guilty plea under subsection (C) of Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
 8. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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Guidelines—facts that would normally be determined by judges at 
sentencing. Many defendants who waived their rights to review 
obtained clauses in their agreements that limited their exposure to 
unexpected negative results at sentencing. 
Our preliminary study also corroborates some concerns raised by 
critics of appeal waivers. Some defendants in our study appear to 
have received neither greater certainty in sentencing nor leniency in 
return for waiving all rights to review. Three-quarters of the 
defendants in our sample who waived appeal also waived collateral 
review; of these, fewer than one-third preserved the right to raise a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Waivers have been enforced 
to bar a variety of claims, including claims of ineffective assistance at 
sentencing and assertions of constitutional violations under Blakely 
and Booker. The increased use of stipulations, combined with waiver 
of review, increases the risk that sentences not in compliance with the 
law will proliferate without scrutiny. The uneven practice among 
cases and courts of trading sentencing concessions for waivers also 
suggests that waivers are undercutting efforts to advance consistency 
in federal sentencing. 
I.  APPELLATE REVIEW OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
Appellate review became part of modern sentencing policy in the 
1970s and 1980s. Previously, under indeterminate sentencing, federal 
trial judges rarely spelled out factual findings or gave reasons for their 
sentences. Courts of appeals reviewed trial court compliance with the 
rules that governed sentencing procedure, but those rules were 
relatively uncomplicated. A sentence was virtually unreviewable so 
long as the penalty imposed was on the menu of punishments that 
Congress had authorized for the offense.10 
In the 1960s and 1970s, with equal treatment of similarly situated 
offenders high on social and legal agendas and with crime rates 
soaring,11 reformers took aim at the enormous power exercised by 
 
 10. See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison 
of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1443–47 (1997) (describing the lack of 
meaningful appellate review of sentencing decisions in state and federal courts prior to 1980). 
 11. Compare FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 61 tbl.2 (1973) (noting 285,980 violent crimes in the United 
States in 1960), with FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 41 tbl.2 (1981) (noting 1,308,900 violent crimes in 
the United States in 1980). 
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judges and parole boards to discriminate among offenders in 
allocating punishment. This flexibility, reformers worried, had 
resulted in both unwarranted leniency and arbitrary punishment.12 By 
the 1980s, the federal government and several states had subdivided 
statutory sentence ranges that spanned decades into multiple, smaller 
ranges of limited months.13 Movement within or between ranges was 
carefully regulated and made contingent upon the presence or 
absence of designated information about the offender or offense. In 
these presumptive sentencing systems, only acceptable factors could 
enter the sentencing calculus. Judges were forbidden to sentence 
using extralegal factors such as race, gender, or unique local norms 
for punishment.14 In the federal system, the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984, with its new guidelines for sentencing, promised to “control the 
effects of philosophical differences among judges and varying local 
conditions.”15 Parole was abandoned because it was perceived as 
failing in its missions to reduce crime, distinguish reformed convicts 
from potential recidivists, and administer release decisions equitably 
and predictably.16 Reformers hoped that this reduction in sentencing 
discretion would advance not only the equality of punishment, but 
also its certainty.17 
The glue holding these new presumptive sentencing systems 
together was appellate review. Prosecutors could appeal if a judge 
sentenced a defendant to a sentence lower than the law provided, 
 
 12. See, e.g., ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 5 (1974) (reporting 
a disparity in mock and actual sentencings, including one case in which sentences by different 
judges for the same case ranged from three to twenty years); Brian Forst & Charles Wellford, 
Punishment and Sentencing: Developing Sentencing Guidelines Empirically from Principles of 
Punishment, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 799, 808–14 (1981) (reporting a disparity in mock 
sentencings, including nine out of sixteen scenarios in which some judges recommended twenty-
year sentences while others recommended no imprisonment). 
 13. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.3, at 1210–14 
(3d ed. 2000) (describing the movement from indeterminate to determinate sentencing systems). 
 14. Id. 
 15. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 93 (2004), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_year_study_full.pdf [hereinafter FIFTEEN-YEAR 
REPORT]; see also William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, The Role of Sentencing Guideline 
Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63, 87 
(1993) (“No purpose was more important to Congress and the several Administrations that 
worked for years to enact the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 than the avoidance of 
unwarranted disparity and resulting unfairness in the sentencing of similarly situated 
defendants.”). 
 16. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 40, 56–58, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3223, 3239–41. 
 17. Id. 
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defendants could appeal to make sure judges did not exceed 
authorized sentences, and both could appeal violations of sentencing 
procedures.18 Appellate review of sentencing emerged as the primary 
enforcement mechanism for sentencing reform in federal courts as 
well as in the courts of more than a dozen states.19 Appellate judges 
would also participate in developing the scope and meaning of the 
Guidelines provisions in an ongoing dialogue with the Commission 
about fair process and just punishment.20 
Appellate review has served these goals, but not as well as 
reformers had hoped. Thousands of appellate cases have helped to 
define the permissible application and scope of hundreds of 
provisions in the Guidelines, ranging from those determining when 
sentence increases are warranted by a defendant’s criminal history, to 
those determining when a judge may depart upwards or downwards 
from the recommended sentencing ranges.21 The Commission has 
monitored appellate decisions to determine when to propose 
Guidelines amendments.22 The Supreme Court itself has resolved 
over a dozen disputes about the Guidelines.23 But over the years, the 
consistency of appellate review—so central to controlling disparity 
under the Guidelines—has been undercut by three developments. 
First, parties have manipulated the application of the Guidelines 
through stipulations, expressly resolving sentencing facts and 
Guidelines “scoring” questions as part of the plea agreement. When 
 
 18. See Reitz, supra note 10, at 1451–57 (stating that appellate review in a guidelines 
system should perform two functions: (1) enforcement—that is, making sure that judges apply 
the law, and (2) law making—that is, defining the meaning of terms in statutes and creating a 
common law of departures). 
 19. See generally Reitz, supra note 10 (reviewing the rise of appellate review). For a 
sampling of scholarship advocating appellate review of sentencing, see AM. LAW INST., MODEL 
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT 56 (Kevin R. Reitz reporter, 2003), available at 
http://www.ali.org/ali/ALIPROJ_MPC03.pdf; Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing 
Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 161, 164 (1991); Douglas A. 
Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing: The Opportunity and Need for 
Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93 (1999); Norval Morris, Towards Principled 
Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267, 284–86 (1977); Steven E. Zipperstein, Certain Uncertainty: 
Appellate Review and the Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 621 (1992). 
 20. Reitz, supra note 10, at 1455. 
 21. See Reitz, supra note 10, at 1466 (terming federal appellate review “high 
enforcement/low judicial creativity”). 
 22. Wilkins & Steer, supra note 15, at 76–81. 
 23. See generally JEFRI WOOD, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., GUIDELINE SENTENCING, AN 
OUTLINE OF APPELLATE CASELAW ON SELECTED ISSUES (2002) (outlining significant 
developments in federal court decisions on the Guidelines). 
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the Guidelines first assigned a specific punishment price to each fact, 
“fact bargaining”—long a component of the criminal justice system—
assumed added importance. Defendants and the government could 
anticipate, with greater certainty, which facts might best be tied down 
in the agreement to obtain specific sentence reductions.24 A change to 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1999 made this 
easier still. It authorized parties to enter into not only a plea 
agreement that is conditioned upon the court’s acceptance of a 
negotiated sentence, but also plea agreements conditioned upon the 
court’s acceptance of a negotiated sentence range or sentencing 
factor.25 The result was even more “buried” deals and virtually no 
appellate review of stipulations.26 
Admittedly, Congress and the Commission did see this coming.27 
Probation officers were enlisted to provide objective factual 
information that judges could rely upon to determine the “real” story. 
The Commission warned parties not to “stipulate to misleading or 
non-existent facts,” but instead to “fully disclose the actual facts and 
then explain to the court the reasons why the disposition of the case 
 
 24. See, e.g., Berthoff v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 2d 50, 62 n.19 (D. Mass. 2001), aff’d 
308 F.3d 124 (1st Cir. 2002) (defining “fact bargaining” as “the knowing abandonment by the 
government of a material fact developed by law enforcement authorities or from a witness 
expected to testify in order to induce a guilty plea”); see also Douglas Berman, Is Fact 
Bargaining Undermining the Guidelines?, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 300, 300 (1996) (“[F]act 
bargaining may simply be the process by which parties seeking to strike plea agreements create 
certainty in the guideline calculation.”). 
 25. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). Opponents of the 1999 amendment argued that it would 
“allow parties to agree to offense characteristics regardless of the actual facts . . . found in the 
Pre-Sentencing Report. . . . [T]he primary danger is allowing parties to bind the court to certain 
facts, thus taking away more of the court’s discretionary authority and shifting it to the 
prosecutor’s office.” Memorandum from Professor Dave Schlueter, Reporter, to Members, 
Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Comments on Proposed 
Amendments to Rule 11, at 3 (Mar. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Schlueter Memo] (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal). Opponents also worried that parties would “circumvent the guidelines” to 
reach agreement, and that probation officers’ assessments would be bypassed. Id. at 5. 
 26. For example, as one district court held: 
The district judge can stop this practice, of course, by refusing to accept the plea—but 
will he? Maybe not, if the agreed sentence accords with the judge’s personal sense of 
justice. After all, there will never be any appeal so the matter is beyond review. No 
downward departure will ever be reported, and the case will be resolved simply, 
finally, and completely. 
United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 277 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 27. The Sentencing Reform Act, a Senate Report assured, provided that the Commission 
should issue policy statements to “assure that judges can examine plea agreements to make 
certain that prosecutors have not used plea bargaining to undermine the sentencing guidelines.” 
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3246. 
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should differ from that which such facts ordinarily would require 
under the guidelines.”28 Judges were instructed not to “rely 
exclusively upon stipulations in ascertaining the factors relevant to 
the determination of sentence.”29 The Attorney General, too, ordered 
prosecutors to argue for the application of only those charges and 
factors supported by the facts and not to negotiate facts.30 
But in many districts, bargaining over sentencing factors has 
continued.31 Busy trial judges have little incentive to reject stipulations 
by the parties. In some districts, probation officers do not disturb 
stipulations, and in any event they are rarely asked for their opinion 
until after the plea deal is accepted.32 As the Second Circuit admitted 
recently, “It will ordinarily not be necessary for the court taking the 
plea to question a defendant specifically about each factual 
stipulation . . . . [F]acts admitted in a plea agreement can, and usually 
will, be accepted by the sentencing court as true.”33 The four Supreme 
Court Justices dissenting in United States v. Booker concluded that 
fact bargaining is “quite common under the current system.”34 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Breyer admitted that the “system has not 
worked perfectly; judges have often simply accepted an agreed-upon 
 
 28. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.4 cmt. (2004). 
 29. Id.; see also FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 27–32 (discussing the 
administration of guideline sentencing, including procedures for transparent plea agreements 
and reliable fact-finding). 
 30. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Fed. 
Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.crimelynx.com/ashchargememo.html 
[hereinafter Ashcroft Memo]; Memorandum from Richard Thornburgh, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to All Fed. Prosecutors (Mar. 13, 1989), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 347, 347 
(1994) (directing federal prosecutors to “charge the most serious, readily provable offense or 
offenses consistent with defendant’s conduct”). 
 31. See FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 92 (concluding that “[a]lthough a lack of 
data raises a serious obstacle to quantitative research, a variety of evidence suggests that 
disparate treatment of similar offenders is common at presentencing stages”); id. at 88–92 
(discussing the limitations of existing research and concluding that more research is “sorely 
needed”). Some are convinced that the expectation that the judiciary could control 
prosecutorial manipulation of the Guidelines “has proved utterly in vain.” Green, 346 F. Supp. 
2d at 268; see KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 89–90 (1998) (describing the 
adversarial nature of fact-finding in the sentencing process). 
 32. According to some research, “[i]n a significant number of districts, probation officers 
reported that the court would usually or nearly always defer to the plea agreement when it 
conflicted with information in the presentence report.” FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 15, 
at 86. Other research found that the vast majority of district judges and probation officers 
reported that agreements contained stipulated facts, and a significant percentage indicated that 
these stipulations understated the offense conduct. Id. 
 33. United States v. Granik, 386 F.3d 404, 413 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 34. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 782 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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account of the conduct at issue.”35 A recent Commission report, too, 
concluded that “surveys . . ., field research . . ., and analysis of 
information provided to the Commission in presentence reports have 
suggested that uneven charging and plea bargaining undermine the 
guidelines and result in sentencing disparity in a substantial number 
of cases.”36 Furthermore, “[r]ejection of plea agreements that 
undermine the guidelines, though not unknown, appears to have been 
relatively rare throughout the guidelines era.”37 
Second, appellate review as a means to control sentencing 
disparity has been weakened by federal law exempting from judicial 
review decisions by prosecutors to (1) grant a downward departure 
for the defendant’s substantial assistance in investigating or 
prosecuting another,38 (2) file a safety-valve motion for a sentence 
below the statutory minimum sentence,39 (3) seek a reduced sentence 
under Rule 35,40 or (4) subtract a third point for acceptance of 
responsibility.41 These rules have meant that the decisions to select 
certain defendants for special treatment—and to determine the extent 
of the discount provided—have rested entirely with prosecutors.42 The 
 
 35. Id. at 762 (Breyer, J., for the Court). 
 36. FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 141. 
 37. Id. at 144. 
 38. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2004) (authorizing, upon 
government motion, a lower sentence for a defendant providing substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of another person). 
 39. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)–(f) (2000) (providing authority for imposing a sentence below 
the mandatory minimum sentence upon government motion and substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of another). 
 40. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (providing authority for a court to reduce a defendant’s 
sentence below the mandatory minimum upon government motion and substantial assistance in 
the investigation and prosecution of another). 
 41. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2004) (providing for up to a 
three-point reduction in a defendant’s offense level for the defendant’s acceptance of 
responsibility); Margareth Etienne, Acceptance of Responsibility and Plea Bargaining Under the 
Feeney Amendment, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 109, 110 (2004) (discussing the possible effects of the 
Feeney Amendment, which authorized prosecutors to determine eligibility for the third point). 
 42. Assistant Attorney General Christopher Wray explained: 
[I]t is essential that the Department retain control over whether consideration at 
sentencing will be given for cooperation. Cooperation agreements are an essential 
component of law enforcement and are necessary to penetrate criminal organizations 
and to obtain convictions in court. First, the Department is in the best position to 
evaluate the truthfulness and value of a cooperator’s assistance, by evaluating it 
within the context of the entire body of investigative information and by determining 
whether it is consistent and corroborated by other evidence. But there is a more 
important reason—the Department needs the leverage in order to insist that 
cooperating defendants testify to the complete truth, rather than half-truths. 
Wray, supra note 3, at 15. 
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latest research shows “irregular and inconsistent policies and 
practices among the various districts” for employing departures for 
substantial assistance and that similar variations plague Rule 35(b) 
motions as well.43 The Booker Court’s decision to make all Guidelines 
provisions advisory rather than mandatory, including guidelines 
governing departures for substantial assistance and acceptance of 
responsibility, has arguably relegated the government’s control over 
these adjustments to mere suggestions. Nevertheless, judges after 
Booker must find a reasonable basis for disregarding these 
Guidelines. And judges continue to be powerless to disregard the 
government’s preferences regarding reductions below mandatory 
minimum penalties using either the safety valve or Rule 35.44 
Finally, clauses in plea agreements by which parties waive appeal 
rights have undercut the ability of appellate review to regulate 
inconsistent sentencing practices. Agreements to forego review of the 
sentence and the sentencing process have the potential to disable the 
tools for regulating sentencing discretion that remain after Booker, as 
well as those that are being created in Booker’s wake. The remainder 
of this Article is devoted to an examination of appeal waivers and 
their effects. 
II.  THE APPEAL WAIVER DEBATE 
Waivers were a consequence of the explosion in the number of 
criminal appeals after the Guidelines went into effect.45 Prior to the 
Guidelines, once a defendant entered a guilty plea, there was little to 
appeal. Because defendants waived most pretrial and trial rights when 
pleading guilty, and because sentencing appeals were futile, criminal 
appeals were primarily reserved for those few defendants who were 
convicted after trial. But the new sentencing statutes and the 
Guidelines changed that. The Guidelines provided hundreds of new 
sentencing issues for defendants to raise on appeal, even after 
 
 43. FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 103–06. 
 44. Pending legislation would increase even further prosecutorial power regarding safety-
valve reductions. See H.R. 1528, 109th Cong. §§ 2, 3, 6 (2005) (seeking to amend 18 U.S.C.  
§ 3553(f)). 
 45. See Catherine M. Goodwin, Summary: 1996 Committee on Criminal Law Memo on 
Waivers of Appeal and Advisement of the Right to Appeal, 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 212, 212, 214 
n.2 (1998) (predicting an increase in appeal waivers due to the high number of appeals and 
other factors). 
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pleading guilty. The hope of avoiding these sorts of challenges 
motivated prosecutors to include appeal waivers in plea agreements. 
Appeal waivers appeared early in the Fourth Circuit, which held 
them enforceable in the early 1990s, and in border districts with 
unprecedented numbers of illegal reentry cases.46 Under so-called 
fast-track programs,47 prosecutors in 1995 began to allow defendants 
who pled guilty early to obtain a much lower sentence, often through 
prosecutors’ agreements to drop or not to add a charge, so long as the 
defendant agreed in return to waive everything including the right to 
appeal.48 
 
 46. E.g., United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567–68 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 52–53 
(4th Cir. 1990). 
 47. See FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 34 (discussing fast-track programs). 
 48. This fast-track system for trafficking and immigration cases was eventually upheld by 
the Ninth Circuit in 1995 and later authorized by Congress. See United States v. Estrada-Plata, 
57 F.3d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding “absolutely nothing wrong with (and, quite frankly, a 
great deal right) with” the fast-track policy); see also The PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-21, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003) (instructing the Commission to issue a policy 
statement authorizing an early disposition program); Government’s Memorandum of Law in 
Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for a Non-Guideline Sentence Based on the Existence of 
Fast-Track Programs 2–8, United States v. Krukowski, No. 04 Cr. 1308 (2d Cir. June 10, 2005), 
available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/61005_govt_ 
opposition_to_sg_variance_due_to_fasttrack.pdf [hereinafter Government’s Memo] (tracing the 
history of fast-track programs and noting that entitlement to fast-track departures or 
concessions requires waiver of the rights to file any pretrial motions, appeal, or seek review 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). The PROTECT Act limited judicial discretion to depart below the 
Guidelines sentence, but specifically authorized departures in accordance with fast-track 
programs—at least those fast-track programs authorized by the Attorney General.  
§ 401(m)(2)(B). The Commission soon adopted a policy statement on fast-track provisions. U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K3 (2004); see also id. at app. C, amend. 651 (issuing a 
policy statement effective October 27, 2003). One of the requirements for fast-track approval by 
the Attorney General is that the district must require each defendant “to waive appeal” and “to 
waive the opportunity to challenge his or her conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, except on the 
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Memorandum Regarding Dep’t Principles for 
Implementing an Expedited Disposition or Fast-Track Prosecution Program in a District, from 
John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All United States Attorneys (Sept. 22, 2003) 
[hereinafter Fast-Track Memo], available at http://www.crimelynx.com/fasttrack.html. 
Interviewees also commented on the link between fast-track cases and the origins of appeal 
waivers. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #15 (stating that waivers started “seven to 
ten years [ago] . . . in immigration [fast-track cases]”). As one defender noted: 
Where they first started was in a category of cases: mule cases. These are cases where 
you have very low level drug couriers. . . . [O]ur district adopted a policy because of 
volume, and maybe because everybody recognized the sentences were inappropriate 
for these people, who are more like victims themselves, that let you plead to an 
amount that carried a sentence of zero to twenty rather than the ten to life. They just 
did it on their own, justified on the basis of volume. . . . That policy has existed almost 
twenty years, and we started to see appeal waivers there first. As a condition for 
getting this, appeal waiver crept in . . . . We were pissed off when it began, but frankly 
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Once appeal waivers caught on in the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Circuits, they soon took hold elsewhere. Prosecutors loved them. 
Recalled one prosecutor, “We were spending attorney resources on 
appeals [in cases that] we eventually won. We have in the office only 
generalists; our trial attorneys do their own appellate briefs. A couple 
big appeals per year can hurt your indictment productivity.”49 By the 
end of 1995, six additional courts of appeals had upheld the validity of 
appeal waivers, and United States Attorneys received a memo from 
Washington encouraging them to consider whether the employment 
of appeal waivers would be a “useful addition” in their districts.50 
At roughly the same time, Congress was considering limiting 
collateral relief for federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Federal 
prisoners who pleaded guilty not only could appeal their sentences, 
but they also retained access to § 2255 for claims such as breach of the 
plea agreement, ineffective assistance of counsel, failure of the 
prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence, some double jeopardy 
violations, and the unconstitutionality of the statute defining the 
defendant’s offense.51 Waiver clauses in plea agreements were 
modified to bar this sort of collateral review as well.52 
But it was not only prosecutors who supported appeal waivers. 
Many judges encouraged them too.53 In 1995, in response to a Federal 
 
from the prosecutor’s point of view it made lots of sense. You are giving up the store. 
Then it spread to everything. 
Telephone Interview with Defender #9. 
 49. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #1; see, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender 
#14 (“They finally saw from other districts that this was a very effective thing to cut down on 
what they saw were frivolous appeals.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #15 (“I think they 
started here because they have a relatively small appellate division . . . . The guys running it 
adopted a rule that if you didn’t have an appeal waiver you had to write your own appeal. There 
were only [a small number of] lawyers doing all the appellate work, they just decided to do this, 
after hearing about it nationally.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #21 (“[Prosecutors 
started asking for waivers] [b]ecause they’re lazy. [They] don’t want to do their work. My 
friends in the United States Attorney’s office at the time told me . . . they were tired of 
people . . . filing baseless claims, and they didn’t want to fool with them.”). 
 50. Memorandum from John C. Keeney, Acting Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
All United States Attorneys (Oct. 4, 1995), reprinted in 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 209, 209 (1998) 
[hereinafter Keeney Memo]. 
 51. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, at § 21.6(a) (synthesizing the law regarding the 
rights waived or forfeited by a plea). 
 52. See Anup Malani, Habeas Settlements 28–32 (Univ. of Va. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 7, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/ 
uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art7 (tracing the rise of “habeas waivers”). 
 53. See Lynn Fant & Ronit Walker, Reflections on a Hobson’s Choice: Appellate Waivers 
and Sentencing Guidelines, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 60, 60 (1998) (“From an examination of the 
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Judicial Center survey on the Guidelines sent to over 1,100 of the 
1,189 federal district and circuit judges, 67 percent of district judges 
who responded and 62 percent of responding circuit judges agreed 
that “[w]aivers of appeal should be used more frequently.”54 In 1996, 
judges from the Committee on Criminal Law of the Judicial 
Conference proposed that Federal Rule 11 be amended specifically to 
require the court to discuss with defendants any term in a plea 
agreement that waives the right to appeal or collateral attack.55 This 
change, it was argued, would not only better inform defendants, it 
would “help protect any appeal waivers against reversal.”56 
Opponents viewed the proposed amendment as an invitation to 
adopt waiver provisions that were unconstitutional, unnecessary, and 
unwise.57 Waivers are unconstitutional, opponents first argued, 
 
spate of opinions upholding appellate waivers in almost every circumstance, however, it appears 
that the courts of appeals want to limit their participation in the sentencing game.”). In United 
States v. McGilvery, 403 F.3d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 2005), after finding that the waiver clause barred 
appeal, including any Booker claim, the Sixth Circuit stated: 
The Court and the parties have unnecessarily devoted substantial time and resources 
on this appeal. In order to avoid similar situations in the future, we strongly 
encourage the government to promptly file a motion to dismiss the defendant’s 
appeal where the defendant waived his appellate rights as part of a plea agreement, 
and to attach a copy of the appellate-waiver provision and the transcript of the plea 
colloquy showing the district court’s compliance with Rule 11(b)(1)(N). Once the 
defendant responds, the matter can then be referred to a motions panel for 
disposition. 
 54. MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER’S 1996 SURVEY, 
REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAW OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 22 tbl.14 (1997). Judges were also given the opportunity to agree or disagree 
with the following statement: “Waivers of appeal should be used less frequently.” Thirty percent 
of the district judges and 24 percent of the circuit judges agreed. Id. Our interviewees also 
reported that district judges appreciated waivers. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender 
#12 (“[T]he judges like ‘em, because their decisions don’t get reviewed by anybody.”); 
Telephone Interview with Defender #14 (“Newer judges really do like [the appeal waivers].”); 
Telephone Interview with Defender #15 (“[Judges] kinda like them. They won’t get reversed. 
This is how they keep score in their lives.”); Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #4 (“These 
district court judges carry the same docket, they want to get rid of these cases just like we do.”). 
 55. See Minutes of the Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 4 
(Oct. 7–8, 1996), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/cr10-796.htm. 
 56. Goodwin, supra note 45, at 213. Many of the practitioners interviewed mentioned trial 
bench support for appeal waivers. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #6 (“The judges 
have not tried to change the appeal waivers. They are standard operating procedure. . . . It’s just 
routine, [a]ccepted by everybody as part of the deal.”); see also infra notes 84 & 124 and 
accompanying text. 
 57. See Schlueter Memo, supra note 25 (“A majority of the commentators addressing this 
amendment . . . are opposed to [it]. The general view is that this provision will signal an 
approval of such provisions before the Supreme Court has had an opportunity to settle the 
question of whether such a provision is constitutional.”). 
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because there could be no knowing waiver of potential future errors 
that might occur at a proceeding that had yet to take place. Because 
sentencing had yet to take place, defendants could not possibly know 
and the judge at the plea proceeding could not describe what claims 
defendants were waiving.58 Opponents also protested that waiver “is 
not a condition over which criminal defendants can bargain.”59 They 
argued that to promote appeal waivers was to promote contracts of 
adhesion. Third, critics pointed out that trial judges and attorneys 
should not be encouraged to insulate from review their own past and 
future misconduct through waiver of direct and collateral review.60 
Finally, waivers were assailed as bad policy because they undercut the 
function of appellate courts in regulating the sentencing process.61 
Even the Department of Justice warned, in its memo encouraging the 
inclusion of appeal waivers, that the “disadvantage of the broad 
sentencing appeal waiver is that it could result in guideline-free 
sentencing of defendants in guilty plea cases, and it could encourage a 
lawless district court to impose sentences in violation of the 
guidelines.”62 
 
 58. See, e.g., Letter from Robert W. Ritchie, Chairman, Fed. Criminal Procedures Comm., 
Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, at 2 (Feb. 11, 1998) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“At the time of a plea . . . a 
defendant does not have the ability to see into the future to predict how a judge might 
erroneously sentence him or her.”). 
 59. David E. Carney, Waiver of the Right to Appeal Sentencing in Plea Agreements with the 
Federal Government, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1019, 1044 (1999); see United States v. 
Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 570–80 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J., concurring specially) (emphasizing 
that a waiver of “the right to appeal a sentence that has yet to be imposed . . . is inherently 
uninformed and unintelligent”). 
 60. See Letter from the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, 
Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, at 9 (Feb. 15, 1998) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal) (“We have no research on how appellate waivers would affect sentencing. It 
would appear, however, that where both parties and the court know that nothing they do will be 
subject to review, we are on the road to encouraging lawlessness.”). 
 61. See, e.g., id. at 10 (arguing that “[t]he wholesale use of appellate waivers will make it 
impossible for the Commission to ‘review and revise’ sentences in a rational way,” and that 
without a complete review of sentences, “it will be impossible to determine whether or when 
unwarranted disparity of sentences exists”). 
 62. Keeney Memo, supra note 50, at 210; see, e.g., United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 
45 (D.D.C. 1997) (expressing concern over possible unchecked prosecutorial manipulation of 
sentences after an appeal waiver); Melancon, 972 F.2d at 575 (Parker, J., concurring specially) 
(arguing that enforcing appeal waivers insulates from review violations of departure rules, 
erroneous applications of the Guidelines, and “factual inadequacies in the presentence reports 
generated by nonjudicial probation officers”). 
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The rule change moved ahead despite these objections,63 and 
when the amendment went into effect in 1999, it was the green light 
some prosecutors and judges had been waiting for.64 With the 
exception of the D.C. Circuit, which has not yet squarely ruled on the 
propriety of appeal waivers,65 each circuit has now endorsed their 
validity while adopting its own exemptions for certain sorts of claims. 
Common exemptions include claims that a sentence is based on race 
discrimination,66 exceeds the statutory maximum authorized,67 or is 
the product of ineffective assistance of counsel.68 In the wake of the 
Court’s decision in Blakely in 2004, defense attorneys in districts 
where appeal waivers were still uncommon found waivers proposed 
as part of every plea agreement.69 
Despite the near-uniform acceptance of appeal waivers by the 
courts of appeals, their validity is as controversial as ever and has yet 
to be addressed by the Supreme Court. With reformers poised to rely 
on appellate review in the next wave of sentencing reform, it is time 
 
 63. The Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure believed “it was 
appropriate to recognize what is apparently already taking place in a number of jurisdictions 
and formally require trial judges in those jurisdictions to question the defendant about whether 
his or her waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.” H.R. DOC. NO. 106-55, at 
13 (1999) (Conf. Rep.) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). A “disclaimer” was added to the 
Committee Note, which reads “the Committee takes no position on the underlying validity of 
such waivers.” Id. at 21–22. 
 64. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #7 (“[E]very single plea agreement had 
appeal waivers. . . . [starting] about the same time they were codified in Rule 11. Cases started 
coming down saying that they are valid. As they became more and more prevalent, the practice 
widened. When they put it in the rule it made it seem reasonable and expected.”). 
 65. In United States v. West, 392 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2004), the court enforced a waiver 
clause in the defendant’s plea agreement, but only after noting that the defendant had failed to 
provide a reason not to, id. at 452, and stating specifically that the court was not addressing the 
question whether such waivers were valid as a general matter, id. at 460–61. 
 66. E.g., United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 22–23 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 67. E.g., United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 68. E.g., United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732–33 (4th Cir. 1994). For a further 
discussion of ineffective assistance claims, see infra notes 115–122 and accompanying text. Some 
circuits have adopted a multifactor “miscarriage of justice” test. E.g., United States v. Khattak, 
273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 24–25 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 69. In districts where appeal waivers had not been used before Blakely, prosecutors 
suddenly announced waivers would be standard policy in every agreement. Memorandum 
Regarding Departmental Legal Positions and Policies in Light of Blakely v. Washington from 
James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Fed. Prosecutors 4 (July 2, 
2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Complained one defender interviewed shortly after 
Blakely, “[T]his is hitting us all at once, in one fell swoop—Blakely, then waivers.” Telephone 
Interview with Defender #5. 
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to take a closer look at appeal waivers to see how they have affected 
criminal practice. 
III.  ASSESSING APPEAL WAIVERS 
Much of the debate about appeal waivers turns upon empirical 
assertions, such as the claim by critics that defendants have no choice 
but to sign waivers to secure plea agreements, or the claim by 
supporters that ineffective assistance claims are usually exempted 
from waivers. The interviews and data in this study provide a rich 
source of new information about the nature, frequency, and effects 
that appeal waivers have today. Before turning to the findings, 
however, it is important to understand some of the limitations of the 
statistical results reported here. 
First, the data is based on a random sample from the group of FY 
2003 cases that were coded by the Commission staff as including a 
written plea agreement or other written agreement in the file. The 
sample is quite large (971 cases), but it does not include the unknown 
percentage of cases in which a plea agreement existed but was not 
physically submitted to the Commission, nor does it include cases in 
which a plea agreement was placed under seal (approximately 3 
percent of all cases).70 
Perhaps for these reasons, the mix of cases in our randomly 
selected sample is somewhat different than the overall mix of cases 
nationwide for FY 2003. For example, as shown in Figure 2, our 
sample contains a slightly higher percentage of drug trafficking and 
firearms cases, and a slightly lower percentage of fraud and 
immigration cases. Our sample is also a bit heavy on Ninth Circuit 
cases, and a bit light on Fifth Circuit cases, compared to the mix of 
cases sentenced in FY 2003.71 Because downward departures are 
much more common in drug trafficking cases than in any other type 
of case (nearly 40 percent of trafficking cases in 2003 received a 
downward departure), and more common in the Ninth Circuit than in 
any other circuit (39 percent of all cases in 2003 from the Ninth 
Circuit received a downward departure), it is also not surprising to 
see in Figure 3 that in our sample there is also a larger proportion of 
 
 70. Of the approximately 70,000 cases sentenced in FY 2003, about 96 percent involved 
conviction by guilty plea, and about 75 percent included some kind of written agreement. U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 6 tbl.1A, 23 
tbl.10 (2003). 
 71. See infra Figure 1. 
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cases with downward departures than there is in all cases sentenced 
under the Guidelines in 2003.72 
Figure 1.  Case Distribution Among Circuits, Sample Compared to  
FY 2003 Complete 
Figure 2.  Case Distribution among Offense Type, Sample Compared 
to FY 2003 Complete 
 
 72. Comparing the sample with 2003 data showed a nonrandom difference in the 
distribution of cases among circuits and among the top four offense types, as well as a 
nonrandom difference in the proportion of cases with substantial assistance or other downward 
departures. 
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Figure 3.  Relative Frequency of Departures, Sample Compared  
to FY 2003 Complete 
We begin our examination of appeal waivers by considering 
whether they have achieved the benefits that supporters hoped for. 
We then turn to whether the costs of appeal waivers predicted by 
opponents are reflected in our findings. 
A. The Benefit of Waivers: Slowing the Rate of Appeals 
Prosecutors and courts adopted appeal waivers primarily because 
they hoped to reduce the number of sentencing appeals.73 A lower 
appeal rate not only saves government resources, it also means more 
finality—a particular concern for victims.74 Our evidence suggests that 
appeal waivers have probably had these intended effects. 
Throughout the 1990s, the number of convictions grew faster 
than the number of appeals.75 Specifically, as Figure 4 illustrates, the 
rate of appeals per conviction peaked in 1994 at about double the rate 
prior to 1987 (when the Sentencing Reform Act became effective) 
and has consistently declined since then. Importantly, the appeal rate 
declined even when considering only cases sentenced after a guilty 
plea, which are less likely to generate appeals than tried cases.76 This 
 
 73. See supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text. 
 74. Carney, supra note 59, at 1037–38. 
 75. JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS, 1999, 
WITH TRENDS 1985–99 (2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fca99.pdf. 
 76. See infra Figure 6. The government’s more frequent insistence on appeal waivers may 
cause some defendants to forego written agreements altogether, instead pleading guilty 
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suggests that the drop in the overall appeal rate cannot be attributed 
solely to the decline during the same period in the number of cases 
that went to trial.77 It is possible that the shrinking appeal rate was 
caused by other factors, but the general timing of the decline 
coincides with the increased enforcement of waivers by the courts of 
appeals.78 
Figure 4.  Appeal Rate 1998–2004—All Offenses 
Note: Rate is the total number of criminal appeals for the year divided by the 
total number of defendants convicted in district court for the same year. 
 
“straight up” to the indictment, sometimes known as “open” or “blind” pleas. An effort to 
determine whether the proportion of “open” or “blind” pleas had increased compared to the 
proportion of guilty pleas with agreement using the Commission’s data was inconclusive. The 
coding of variables that could help identify the presence or absence of a plea agreement rather 
than an open plea was entirely revised in 1997 and 1998. Even after 1998, the variable 
(DSPLEA) is an unreliable measure of open versus negotiated pleas over time, due to missing 
cases and the ambiguous meaning of some values. 
 77. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 2001, WITH 
TRENDS 1982–2001 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fccp01.pdf. 
 78. Among alternative explanations for a decline in the frequency of appeals during this 
period are the 1999 amendment to Rule 11 allowing stipulations to Guidelines ranges and 
factors, see supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text, and the gradual resolution of initially 
controversial sentencing issues by the courts of appeals. 
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Figure 5.  Appeal Rate 1994–2004—All, Drug, and Immigration 
Offenses Compared 
Note: Appeal rates are derived by dividing the number of appeals filed in cases of the 
specified type by the number of defendants convicted that year of that offense type. 
Sources: Federal Criminal Case Processing, 1982–1993; Federal Criminal Case 
Processing 1982–2002; Statistical Tables for December 2003 and 2004, Tables B7 and 
D4, from the website for the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
(values for 2003 and 2004). 
Figure 6.  Appeal Rate Comparing Total Appeals to Guilty Plea 
Convictions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Rate is the total number of criminal appeals for the year divided by the number 
of defendants convicted by guilty plea for the same year. 
Source: Commission Annual Statistical Reports. 
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Prosecutors interviewed for our study also reported that they 
believed waivers had reduced their appellate burden. One prosecutor 
commented that the adoption of appeal waivers “has been wildly 
successful. Looking at the stats, we are writing far fewer briefs. . . . I 
would say it [has] led to a 25% drop.”79 Another prosecutor 
volunteered that waivers save “significant resources. . . . From a 
prosecutor’s perspective with limited resources, the broader we can 
make these waivers the better. If [defendants] give up the right to jury 
trial, they should give up the rest as well.”80 Reported another, 
“Seems to me that it has narrowed the issues on appeal[;] even if 
there is no proof that the number of appeals went down, appeals are 
now easier to respond to.”81 
B. The Costs of Appeal Waivers 
As for the anticipated costs of appeal waivers, our findings do 
not present a simple story. We review below the information that the 
interviews and data have provided relating to six criticisms of appeal 
waivers. 
1. Are They Adhesion Contracts?  Based on our interviews and 
waiver sample, we must answer this question, “No.” The prediction 
that defendants have neither power to avoid signing agreements with 
unlimited waivers, nor leverage to negotiate benefits in return for 
signing them, has proved demonstrably untrue, at least in some 
districts. Defense attorneys in some districts report that they have had 
the ability, particularly when supported by the trial bench,82 to avoid 
 
 79. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #1. 
 80. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #2. 
 81. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #6. 
 82. Some trial judges initially balked at endorsing appeal waivers and would reject 
agreements with waivers in them. Consider the comments of Defender #9: 
I used to say at the plea that these things were illegal because you can’t waive your 
right to appeal voluntariness and knowing understanding of the waiver itself. If I held 
a gun to my client’s head and say “Sign this,” he’s gotta be able to appeal on that 
basis. That’s what I’d say to the judge. For a while they took it out. But I gave up. 
They put it all back in. 
See also Telephone Interview with Defender #7 (“Some [trial judges] will still resist accepting 
them if there is a real dispute, but this is borderline participation in the negotiations in my view. 
One judge was against these, and the government was going to go after him with a writ of 
mandamus, because he wasn’t accepting them.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #20 
(“[J]udges didn’t like it. . . . [They b]elieved it would insulate them from being reviewed. 
Thought it was wrong. They harassed the government about it—why did they really need them? 
[The] [g]overnment eventually gave up.”). 
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these waivers, to limit them, or, alternatively, to obtain significant 
concessions in return for signing them. 
a. Evidence That Defendants Are Avoiding Appeal Waivers.  
Several interviewees reported negotiating agreements without appeal 
waivers, sometimes as a result of a threat to plead guilty without an 
agreement (known as pleading “open” or “blind”) or to go to trial if 
the waiver was not removed.83 Over one-third (323, or 34.8 percent) of 
the agreements in our random sample contained no clause waiving 
review, while 619 (65.2 percent) included some waiver clause. As 
illustrated in Figure 7, the proportion of agreements with waiver 
clauses varied widely among the circuits. It was a rare plea agreement 
in the Ninth Circuit that lacked a waiver clause, whereas in the D.C., 
First, and Third Circuits, waivers were the exception, not the rule. If 
the cases from the Ninth Circuit are excluded, only 52 percent of the 
agreements in the sample contained any sort of waiver. 
 
Additionally, Prosecutor #2 said: 
Some judges were opposed to any language. They refused to take a plea. If we felt 
that the government was conceding something or giving something up, they were 
waiving this knowingly and with advice of counsel we would stick to it. The judges 
would understand. Not sure if we ended up with [a] complete standoff. There were 
two judges who didn’t like them, questioned whether they constitutionally should be 
allowed. Others look at them on a case-by-case basis. 
Similarly, Prosecutor #1 indicated: 
Initially, there were judges who said this is not right. One or two who made 
statements later [at the plea hearing or at sentencing] that undercut the appeal 
waiver. We always include in an advice of rights we prepare as a back up on the 
judge’s colloquy, asking what he is waiving in [the] plea agreement. Some judges are 
resistant, but our court of appeals has educated them. 
 83. For example, one defense attorney reported, 
Only a very small percentage of agreements will include waivers, and then only if 
[they] receive approval . . . . We have a very aggressive United States Attorney’s 
office and they will seek them in every case, but we refuse them, in all but the most 
compelling circumstances. . . . Only if there is a significant advantage that could be 
achieved by entering into it, an advantage that we couldn’t obtain otherwise, by trial 
or negotiation [do we agree to waivers]. Usually the prosecutor would have to agree 
not to file an 851 [a charge that increases the minimum sentence] or drop a charge or 
not bring a charge. Not very common. 
Telephone Interview with Defender #19. Similarly, Defender #21 reported, 
[Signing an appeal waiver meant y]ou get the third point [off for acceptance of 
responsibility under 3E1.1]. Can’t get it here if you plead open. . . . Second, we can 
still bargain counts in this district. May have a 924(c) [firearm charge carrying a 
mandatory minimum consecutive sentence] dismissed, and take the two-point 
enhancement for gun. Third, they might limit drug quantity. Particularly if there are 
several transactions separated by time [the parties will agree not to count some]. . . . 
[I]t is the regular practice that if you can’t come to an agreement, and the defense 
attorney says I’m going to plead open . . . then the United States Attorney would 
agree to take out the appeal waiver. 
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Figure 7.  Percentage of Plea Agreements with Waivers, by Circuit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Obtaining Concessions in Exchange.  Waiver supporters also 
argue that defendants who sign waivers are getting something in 
return as part of the bargain. One defender’s comments are telling: 
Two of our judges said they will not accept an agreement with a 
waiver. . . . The defendant complained. The defendant would say, “I 
want this because I want the 5K1 [downward departure for 
substantial assistance]. I want my 5K1!” The judges realized there 
was a problem, that they were hurting some defendants by refusing 
these [waivers].84 
Appellate courts, too, often point out that they must uphold waivers 
to preserve their value for defendants.85 Judge Posner, for example, 
recently described why a waiver should be enforced: 
The government didn’t want [the defendant] to appeal and was 
willing to offer concessions that he and his lawyer considered 
adequate to induce him to forego his right to appeal. Had [the 
 
 84. Telephone Interview with Defender #7. 
 85. See, e.g., United States v. Granik, 386 F.3d 404, 412 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Knowing and 
voluntary appellate waivers included in plea agreements must be enforced because, if they are 
not, ‘the covenant not to appeal becomes meaningless and would cease to have value as a 
bargaining chip in the hands of defendants.’” (citations omitted)). 
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defendant] insisted on an escape hatch that would have enabled him 
to appeal if the law changed in his favor after he was sentenced, the 
government would have been charier in its concessions.86 
Many practitioners confirmed that when waivers are included as 
part of a plea agreement, those waivers are often exchanged for 
concessions of one sort or another from the prosecutor. One 
defender’s explanation was typical of many of those interviewed: 
“Our position is we’re only going to sign one if we get a significant 
concession. . . . If not, we plead open, [because there’s] not much 
advantage to entering into an agreement.”87 Another explained, 
When the prosecutor insisted on these, in one or two cases, we 
would withdraw, saying it was a conflict of interest. Then the court 
and the government were put in the position of spending a lot more 
money, [and] the government backed down in a hurry. Eventually 
we came to this agreement: [n]o appeal waivers without a significant 
chit in return. In my office any appeal waiver has to be approved by 
me. So they don’t bother to ask unless they can come up with 
something in hand.88 
Another defender listed the usual price for agreeing to an appeal 
waiver in his district: 
An agreement that an enhancement [under the Guidelines] doesn’t 
apply; that they will not oppose the minimum sentence in the 
Guidelines range; that they will not bring an additional charge 
 
 86. United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 87. Telephone Interview with Defender #14. Pleading open was a common response to 
appeal waivers. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #1 (“Most cases plead open, but 
enter into agreement when consequences of not agreeing are so bad, they’ll drop a charge or 
some relevant conduct.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #4 (“[M]y response is to plead 
guilty without a plea agreement [in about 50 to 75 percent of cases]. They are throwing so much 
crap in the plea agreements these days.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #5 (“Originally, 
when this first happened, we reacted by entering open pleas and abandoning agreements. . . . 
My fear is that if we refuse to sign and do an open plea, then they will overcharge to preclude 
open pleas.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #9 (“The default position was plead open, so 
unless you were afraid of upward departure or you want the Guidelines calculations in front of 
probation [i.e., prior to the preparation of the presentence report], you don’t sign it. This was 
allegedly the office position.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #19 (“We reject them. 
Mostly open pleas, but we also reject them from plea agreements as well. . . . Now it may be 
different in districts where you can get substantial advantages from waivers, under fast-track or 
negotiation, I understand waivers might be more attractive.”); Telephone Interview with 
Defender #21 (“[A]bout 25–30% of the open pleas are in meth cases. The penalties are so 
outrageous, and they have a hard time proving quantity. And even with acceptance they don’t 
give you much.”). 
 88. Telephone Interview with Defender #8. 
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carrying a consecutive sentence . . . ; that they won’t enhance with a 
prior [conviction] that would up the mandatory minimum . . . ; or a 
stipulation that there is no other relevant conduct, or [otherwise 
limiting an] enhancement under Chapter 3.89 
Explained another, 
[I]f the government was dropping . . . a mandatory minimum, they 
can stick whatever they want into it. There has to be a significant 
benefit to the client. . . . Say a safety-valve stipulation or in some 
cases a stipulation to a mitigating role. Anything really significant 
like that. . . . We say we don’t like them but when you tell the client 
this will save you two years, they’ll say, “I’ll sign.”90 
 
 89. Telephone Interview with Defender #3. “Relevant conduct” is defined in U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2004) (providing that a sentence should take into 
account “all acts and omissions committed, aided, . . . or willfully caused by the defendant; 
and . . . all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity” that occurred during the preparation or commission of the offense 
of conviction, or during attempt to avoid detection and responsibility for that offense). Chapter 
3 of the Guidelines includes provisions specifying certain increases in the defendant’s offense 
level, which is used to determine the sentence, depending upon whether or not certain facts are 
present. Id. §§ 3A1.1–C1.2. 
 90. Telephone Interview with Defender #15. This attorney also reported, “This is a district 
that will do charge bargains as part of a deal.” Id. For additional comments on the same topic, 
see Telephone Interview with Defender #3 (“[I]n a drug case, the government would threaten to 
give nothing on priors, say he’s got to waive his appeal or we’re going to enhance him.”); 
Telephone Interview with Defender #8 (“We would require either a departure or a 
misdemeanor or something similar.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #14 (“[W]e’re only 
going to sign one if we get a significant concession. Generally we get a downward departure for 
cooperation. If not, we plead open, not much advantage to entering into an agreement.”). 
Similarly, Defender #7 reported, 
Our policy was not to agree unless we would actually get something of substance in 
return, more than the bottom of the Guidelines range and acceptance points. These 
would be worthless because the judge would give them anyway in a blind plea. So it 
would boil down to a 5K departure or, if there was a closely contested Guidelines 
issue, then the government would have to agree that the enhancement would not 
apply. . . . They’ll agree to dismiss a bunch of counts, but it doesn’t matter because of 
the Guidelines. If they agree to dismiss a count that carries a consecutive sentence 
that would be [enough to sign a waiver]. 
Defender #17 also reported, 
[We] won’t enter one unless there is a major concession [such as a] declination to 
charge a readily provable offense, limitation of relevant conduct, sometimes an 
agreement to a minor role, 5K cooperation. . . . Our leverage is that we’ll just go to 
trial. Then you have to be sure to . . . explain [to the judge] that you were ready to 
plead open to X felony, but the government decided to pile this on unless you signed 
the appeal waiver. Judges wouldn’t like that. . . . [I]n our office, you have to go 
through a supervisor to do a plea agreement with an appeal waiver. The policy here is 
we won’t sign unless we get something for it. 
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Admittedly, the claims of defenders that they are negotiating 
good deals for waivers are self-serving. Several prosecutors, however, 
confirmed that they paid a price for the appeal waivers: “Often we 
give up cooperation [5K departure]. . . . There are individual 
defenders who will not enter into agreements with waivers, but will 
plead open . . . . So they can pressure [us] to give something else up in 
return for the waiver.”91 
To examine whether these reports were reflected in the data, we 
compared the frequency of the same sentencing concessions in cases 
with and without waivers. Some government concessions appeared 
more frequently in agreements with waivers than in agreements 
without. Specifically, as shown in Tables 1 and 2, those who waived 
appeal were more likely than nonwaiving defendants to receive a 
promise by the government to seek a safety-valve reduction 
(applicable in drug cases only), as well as to actually receive 
downward departures.92 
Several cases in our sample had text explanations for departures. 
Looking specifically at these cases,93 judges were more likely to list 
“pursuant to plea agreement” as a reason for departure if there was a 
waiver present. The judge in one waiver case expressly credited the 
waiver as the reason for the downward departure.94 
 
 91. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #1. Said another, “The only way to free fall from 
the man[datory] min[imum] is the safety valve; that will mean we can get a broader appeal 
waiver.” Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #4. 
 92. It is important not to overstate the direction or degree of any relationship between the 
presence of waiver clauses and the use of downward departures. Mapping the rate of 
substantial-assistance departures and the rate of other departures for FY 2003 by circuit, the 
patterns look nothing like the pattern of waiver usage among circuits. This suggests that 
although the presence of a waiver has some influence on the likelihood of a downward 
departure, factors other than waivers have a much stronger influence. 
 93. See infra Table 3. 
 94. The explanation given was “waiver of rights” (the case was from the Southern District 
of California). Another case credited “savings to government” as the reason for downward 
departure. 
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Table 1.  Substantial Assistance & Safety Valve, by Presence of Waiver 
Type of Departure 
% Cases with 
Waiver (n=619) 
% Cases without 
Waiver (n=323) 
Substantial Assistance Departure Part of 
Agreement 
15.5% (96) 13.9% (45) 
Safety Valve Part of Agreement 7.1% (44) 6.2% (20) 
Substantial Assistance Departure Received 14.4% (89) 13.6% (44) 
Safety Valve Received* 19.7% (122) 14.6% (47) 
*p < 0.05. 
Note: The first two measures were coded from the agreements in each of the sample 
cases; the last two are from Commission FY 2003 data for each case. 
Table 2.  Other Departures, by Presence of Waiver 
 
% Cases with 
Waiver (n=619) 
% Cases without 
Waiver (n=323) 
Other Downward Departure Part of Agreement 3.1% (19) 2.8% (9) 
Other Downward Departure Received* 22.0% (136) 9.6% (31) 
*p < 0.05. 
Note: The first measure was coded from the agreements in sample cases; the second 
is from Commission FY 2003 data for each case. Ninety-three cases (68 percent) 
receiving departures other than for substantial assistance were in two districts—
Arizona and Southern District of California. 
Table 3.  Cases with Specified Reason for Departure, by  
Presence of Waiver 
Reason Specified for Downward Departure 
% Cases with 
Waiver (n=619) 
% Cases without 
Waiver (n=323) 
Substantial Assistance Motion* 39.3% (90) 57.1% (44) 
Pursuant to a Plea Agreement* 22.7% (52) 10.4% (8) 
*p < 0.05. 
Note: Source is Commission FY 2003 data, for sample cases. 
A number of concessions were no more likely to appear in cases 
with waivers than in cases without them. Defendants who waived 
review were no more likely than defendants who entered into plea 
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agreements without waivers to receive two or three credits for 
accepting responsibility.95 And defendants who waived review were 
actually less likely to be sentenced at the bottom of the range or to 
receive charge concessions.96 
Table 4.  Where in Range Sentenced, by Presence of Waiver 
 % Cases with 
Waiver (n=619) 
% Cases without 
Waiver (n=323) 
Guideline Range Minimum Sentence Imposed* 35.4% (219) 46.4% (150) 
Guideline Range Maximum Sentence Imposed* 4.4% (27) 6.5% (21) 
*p < 0.05. 
Note: Source is Commission FY 2003 data, for sample cases. 
Table 5.  Charge Agreements, by Presence of Waiver 
Type of Agreement 
% Cases with 
Waiver (n=619) 
% Cases without 
Waiver (n=323) 
Government Agrees Not to Add, or to Drop 
Charges* 
50.4% (311) 57.9% (187) 
Government Agrees to Drop Charges* 42.3% (262) 49.5% (160) 
*p < 0.05. 
Note: Charge bargaining was measured in two ways. The first measure 
(PLEATYPE) was coded based on the specific subsection of Rule 11 that the 
parties noted in the agreement as well as the actual promises made. The second 
measure looked solely at whether the government expressly agreed to drop a 
charge. 
 
 95. See infra Table 6. 
 96. See infra Tables 4 & 5. A large percentage of all agreements included promises not to 
add charges or promises to drop charges, despite the tough stand against charge bargains by 
official Department of Justice policy. See Ashcroft Memo, supra note 30 (“[C]harges should not 
be filed simply to exert leverage to induce a plea.”); see also Amie N. Ely, Note, Prosecutorial 
Discretion as an Ethical Necessity: The Ashcroft Memorandum’s Curtailment of the Prosecutor’s 
Duty to “Seek Justice,” 90 CORNELL L. REV. 237, 239 (2004) (examining the effect of the 
Ashcroft Memo requiring federal prosecutors to “charge and pursue the most serious, readily 
provable offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the case” unless the case meets 
one of the enumerated exceptions and authorization is obtained from a designated supervisor 
(quoting Ashcroft Memo, supra note 30)); cf. United States v. Morgan, 406 F.3d 135, 137 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (barring a Booker claim because of the presence of an appeal waiver and reasoning 
that because the defendant “learned the sentencing range sought by the government and 
avoided exposure to additional drug counts, . . . . [l]imiting his criminal exposure in this way 
presumably was of considerable value to him”). 
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Table 6.  Acceptance of Responsibility Credits, by Presence of Waiver 
 % Cases with 
Waiver (n=619) 
% Cases without 
Waiver (n=323) 
Agreed to Three Points for Acceptance  
of Responsibility 
40.2% (249) 41.8% (135) 
Agreed to Two Points 15.8% (98) 13.3% (43) 
Agreed to Unspecified Adjustment* 12.6% (78) 23.8% (77) 
Three Points Received 70.3% (435) 72.1% (233) 
Two Points Received 25.5% (158) 24.8% (80) 
*p < 0.05. 
Note: The first three values were coded from the agreements in the sample cases. The 
last two were from Commission FY 2003 data for those cases. In FY 2003, 63.2 
percent of all defendants convicted by trial or guilty plea received 3 points for 
acceptance of responsibility; 29.4 percent received 2 points. 
These findings tend to confirm most defenders’ reports that they 
consider it a bad deal to trade an appeal waiver for acceptance points, 
a sentence at the bottom of the range, or a bargained charge without 
a meaningful cap on relevant conduct. Defenders reported that these 
promises offer few advantages over the sentence a defendant would 
receive by pleading guilty to the indictment without waiving review. 
The sentencing concessions related to the presence of a waiver are 
much more substantial. More than one of every five waiver cases 
received a downward departure other than substantial assistance, 
compared to one of every ten nonwaiver cases in our sample. And 
nearly one in five waiver cases received a safety valve adjustment, 
compared to less than one in eight nonwaiver cases. 
2. Unknowing Waivers.  Perhaps the most common objection to 
appeal waivers is that defendants are waiving the possibility of 
challenging future error, error which is unknowable at the time the 
waiver is signed.97 Some comments by defenders echoed this concern. 
“What I don’t like about them is you are waiving something you don’t 
know. You cannot know whether you are going to make a mistake, a 
number of things can happen. It is a dangerous thing to do. . . . Your 
client may suffer for it.”98 
 
 97. See supra note 58. 
 98. Telephone Interview with Defender #7. As Defender #5 said: 
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Both the interviews and the data from the agreements in the 
sample suggested that this objection overstates the uncertainty that 
many defendants face when signing waivers. As waiver critics fear, 
some defendants are heading blindly into sentencing having waived 
whatever error may come their way. Other defendants, however, are 
able to minimize the risk of waiving review by tying down much of 
what goes into the sentencing calculation with stipulations about 
sentencing facts, by agreeing upon a sentence or a sentence cap, or by 
reserving certain claims for appeal. 
a. Stipulations.  Defenders and prosecutors both reported that 
once appeal waivers appeared, stipulations to specific sentences, 
sentence ranges, or sentencing factors became more common in plea 
agreements. Defenders insisted upon stipulations to reduce the risk of 
a later surprise at sentencing that could not be reviewed because of 
the waiver.99 Explained one defender, 
 
[Waivers] are unconscionable. Nobody’s perfect. Lawyers aren’t perfect, judges aren’t 
perfect. Defendants should have the right to challenge their sentencing if we get it 
wrong. I don’t see what interest the government has in cutting off the right to 
review—what interest would they have in an unconstitutionally excessive or 
erroneous sentence? . . . The uncertainty because of what judges will do with 
sentence, that makes it unfair. 
Similarly, Defender #6 said: 
I’m worried about when Probation comes in and contradicts the stipulation. I always 
had to worry about whether Probation is going to do what we expect. . . . Appeal 
waivers risk agreeing to something you didn’t anticipate. 
Additionally, Defender #3 commented: 
[Because of all of the legal uncertainty about sentencing,] I’m very uncomfortable 
with them . . . . I have a case on appeal where the defendant has a prior conviction, 
but [it] may not be a ‘crime of violence’ . . . [and] the question is whether that 
qualifies for four point adjustment. . . . So [you] really don’t know what you are 
waiving. . . . But the government holds all the cards, and you don’t want to screw your 
client because you’re trying to look smart. 
 99. See Telephone Interview with Defender #7 (“[I]f there was a closely contested 
Guidelines issue, then the government would have to agree that the enhancement would not 
apply.”). As Defender #8 indicated: 
In this district, . . . we’ll sit down and negotiate, say “We’ll eat this enhancement, but 
you have to drop the others.” We’ll agree that—using 11(c)(1)(C)—this is the 
appropriate range, or agree that this is not going to apply, that it will go away. Then 
the case is appeal proof for everybody. We’d probably agree to waive appeal from 
Blakely if we’ve agreed like this. 
Defender #12 concurred: 
[I rejected the agreement in one case] but it sort of backfired. At the sentencing 
hearing, the government brought in a guy to testify about how he had [x] kilos of 
cocaine and that judge found for the government. Lost everything I tried to gain, 
trying to save my client’s right to appeal. So the risk is that at sentencing, where the 
probation office, government witnesses come in that can raise the sentence above 
what you were expecting. 
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We have some aggressive probation officers that would stick in all 
sorts of adjustments, or criminal history would come back messed 
up. Our concern is if the court makes an error, we wouldn’t be able 
to fix it. [So w]e’d negotiate it. . . . Most of the time the judges go 
along with the stipulation. . . . If you stipulate that night is day, 
you’re going to have a problem. But if it isn’t obviously false, they 
will go along . . . . The agreements are more detailed. It is getting to 
the point where we agree on almost everything.100 
Reported another defender, 
About the same time appeal waivers came in, that’s when probation 
said, “We’re accepting the stipulations.” Except really obvious stuff, 
like if my guy shot somebody, he can’t claim he didn’t have a gun. So 
this is important in considering appeal waivers, because we’re going 
into it knowing that the [p]robation [o]fficer will not upset 
stipulations.101 
 
 100. Telephone Interview with Defender #15. Additionally, consider the comments of 
Defender #21: 
The Probation Office will follow the plea agreement. It’s the practice in [names 
location], but in [different location], they do not. They routinely report on everything. 
Some judges will go along with it, some will not. For over fifteen or sixteen years, the 
judges have decided that if the prosecutor makes the recommendation and the client 
looks at it and says, “[T]his is what I’m facing if I sign this agreement,” then they 
shouldn’t change it, because the defendant is expecting it as part of the deal. Now in 
[the other district, in the other circuit], it has never been like that. You could plead to 
five grams and find out at sentencing it was 300. 
Defender #16 noted: 
[It d]epends on the judge, whether you want an open plea. . . . If I went in with an 
open plea and the government is going to present all of this relevant conduct[, see 
infra note 89,] and the court might be receptive to finding by a preponderance that 
the relevant conduct occurred, it’s a risk. [It is d]ifferent if there is no relevant 
conduct. If there is, you’d want to stipulate. 
As Defender #12 indicated, “[W]hat is the advantage of signing that agreement? The advantage 
is you know what you get. Without it, it is possible you wouldn’t get what you are expecting, you 
never know what is lurking for you at sentencing.” Finally, Defender #11 reported that 
[in return for an appeal waiver] they may not put in the drug amounts that trigger the 
man[datory] min[imum], [they] might stipulate to an amount for the Guideline[s] 
range rather than man min, or in a fraud case where the investigators have so far 
turned up a small loss amount, they will agree not to look for more frauds, agree on 
that loss amount. Now the [p]robation [o]fficer could come up with more at 
sentencing, but if the government hasn’t already looked in that next box to find it, the 
[p]robation [o]fficer won’t either. . . . In most cases where there is an appeal waiver, 
there are no issues. The prosecutor generally agrees on all the Guidelines factors; if 
not in agreement, have a hearing rather than an agreement. Usually [you are] not 
losing anything by waiver. But if you are losing, [you] shouldn’t have to go without 
appeal, [and] the case law here allows most to get heard. I’m sure we’ve had some 
good issues that have been waived, I don’t see many. 
 101. Telephone Interview with Defender #2; see also Telephone Interview with Defender 
#10 (“[They t]ried appeal waivers a couple of times early on, we resisted, judges resisted, they 
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Prosecutors agreed that in return for appeal waivers defendants 
are looking for stipulations to sentencing factors. . . . In money cases, 
they are looking for stipulations on loss amounts. . . . If I agree to 
come down from the provable loss, I’ll insist that you have to agree 
to a much broader appeal waiver. They are looking for role 
reductions. The loss amount is one they can argue over and 
negotiate. The role is harder. I can’t always look the other way on 
that.102 
Table 7.  Sentence-Related Stipulations, by Presence of Waiver 
Parties Agreed to . . . 
% Cases with 
Waiver (n=619) 
% Cases without 
Waiver (n=323) 
Sentence Range* 32.2% (200) 20.4% (66) 
Sentence Length 5.2% (32) 4.0% (13) 
Sentence Cap* 6.0% (37) .6% (2) 
Sentence Type 1.1% (7) .9% (3) 
Base-Offense Level 33.9% (210) 33.4% (108) 
Specific-Offense Characteristics 11.1% (69) 8.7% (28) 
Final-Offense Level 6.8% (42) 8.4% (27) 
Chapter 3 Adjustment other than 3E1.1  
(Role, etc.) 
12.3% (76) 8.4% (27) 
Criminal History Category* 8.9% (55) 5.3% (17) 
Drug Amount 11.0% (68) 11.1% (36) 
Loss Amount 5.3% (33) 3.7% (12) 
Government Will Not Seek Upward  
Departure 
6.5% (40) 5.9% (19) 
*p < 0.05. 
Table 7 shows that stipulations as to sentence ranges, caps, or 
criminal history category are more common in waiver cases than in 
nonwaiver cases. Not only do these stipulations appear to occur more 
often in waiver cases, but the data suggests that another feature 
 
didn’t take. Recently they are trying again, we resist. The only time we will allow them is with 
a[Rule 11](c)(1)(C) plea. The [assistant U.S. attorneys] started to get more strident for a while, 
but they backed off.”). 
 102. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #4. A defendant’s “role” in the offense may 
influence the sentence: a leader faces a more severe sentence than a defendant who played only 
an insignificant part in the crime. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3B1.1–2 (2004). 
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associated with more predictable sentencing is more prevalent in 
waiver cases: parties are much more likely to have entered into some 
sort of binding sentence agreement, sometimes known as a C plea, 
when a waiver is present. A C plea is a guilty plea under subsection 
(C) of Rule 11(c)(1). Unlike a guilty plea entered under subsection 
(A) or (B) of Rule 11(c)(1), which may include a sentence 
recommendation that the judge can accept or reject, a C plea includes 
sentencing stipulations that the judge may not later reject once the 
plea agreement is accepted.103 
Table 8.  C Pleas, by Presence of Waiver 
 % Cases with 
Waiver (n=619)
% Cases without 
Waiver (n=323) 
Plea Conditioned upon Judge’s Acceptance of 
Stipulations* 
21.5% (133) 3.7% (12) 
Judge Rejects Stipulations 14.9% (92) 18.9% (61) 
*p < 0.05. 
Note: The first value was coded from the agreements in the sample cases. There is 
considerable variation between districts in the use of C pleas. In the Western District 
of Texas, of 60 cases, 52 had waivers but none were C pleas; in the District of Arizona 
of 128 cases, 120 had waivers, and 111 were C pleas; in the Southern District of 
California, of 37 cases all had waivers but none were C pleas. Source for judge 
rejections is Commission FY 2003 data (ACCGDLN=0) for sample cases. 
b. Limiting Scope of Waiver.  Another way defendants can 
reduce the risk posed by an appeal waiver is to limit the scope of the 
waiver itself, so that appeal remains available under certain 
circumstances. Some very broad, blanket waivers discard the right to 
challenge the sentence or the conviction on any ground whatsoever, 
on appeal or collateral attack.104 Of the waivers in our sample, nearly 
 
 103. See infra Table 8. 
 104. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 45, at 213 (quoting from a broad appeal waiver in which 
the defendant waived the right to appeal or collateral attack on any ground). See also United 
States v. Raynor: 
[Y]our client voluntarily and knowingly waives the right to appeal any sentence 
within the maximum provided in the statute(s) of conviction, or the manner in which 
that sentence was determined . . . on any ground whatever. Your client also 
voluntarily and knowingly waives your client’s right to challenge the sentence or the 
manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, included but not limited 
to a motion under [§ 2255]. 
032006 01_KING AND ONEILL.DOC 4/24/2006  12:26 PM 
2005] APPEAL WAIVERS 243 
80 percent barred both direct and collateral challenges.105 About one-
third (35 percent) barred review of sentence only, whereas 63 percent 
barred review of both sentence and conviction. 
Narrower waivers bar enforcement of the waiver under certain 
situations or allow appeal of certain claims. Both our interviews and 
the cases suggest that most waiver clauses have been narrowed in 
some respect. For example, one waiver provides: “Defendant waives 
all rights on direct appeal except for up or down departure, and 
waives all habeas rights except ineffective assistance and 
prosecutorial misconduct.”106 Under another, the defendant “waive[s] 
any right to appeal all . . . issues with the exception of an illegal 
sentence, or a sentence over the statutory max[imum].”107 
Interviewees reported that many waivers expressly allow appeals 
should the sentence exceed the specified sentencing range or number 
of months108 or should the defendant raise specific issues—presumably 
those sentencing issues that worry the defendant most. For example, 
one defender reported, 
If you have a clearly arguable Guidelines difference, when you could 
go either way, 50% of the time I can get that guideline excluded 
from the appeal waiver. . . . [I]n the alternative, we just agree to a 
lower number, lower the cap below which you can’t appeal. See[,] as 
a result of [our circuit’s case law], the agreements specify that you 
waive your right to appeal unless the sentence is above [X], a 
 
989 F. Supp. 43, 43 (D.D.C. 1997) (quoting from the plea agreement). Defender #4 reported that 
under the standard clause in his district, “[T]he defendant waives direct appeal, 2255 and 
habeas, [including] ineffective assistance.” 
 105. Of the sample, 113 barred appeal only (18.3 percent of 619 waivers), and 494 barred 
appeal and collateral review (79.8 percent of all 619 waivers). Cf. Defender #17 (“I don’t know 
why the government has not included 2255 [waivers] in the agreements here. Part of it might be 
the AEDPA [Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996] doesn’t leave much, so 
they don’t view it as so essential. They almost encourage that first petition now.”). 
 106. Telephone Interview with Defender #3. Others reported similar standard waiver 
language. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #13 (“We waiv[e] any attack on [the] 
sentence other than ineffective assistance [or] prosecutorial misconduct, and [retain the right to] 
appeal [an] upward departure.”). 
 107. Telephone Interview with Defender #17; see also United States v. Gibson, 356 F.3d 761, 
765, 767 (7th Cir. 2004) (vacating a conviction and sentence due to sentencing over the statutory 
maximum when an appeal waiver reserved this sort of claim). 
 108. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #9 (“Defendant will not file an appeal or 
otherwise challenge the conviction or sentence in the event of an imposed sentence of [X] 
months or less.”). For an argument that all waivers should be contingent upon sentencing within 
a specified range or up to a specified maximum, see Recent Case, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1116, 1121 
(1998). 
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specified sentence. The government thinks they have to read this 
way to comply with the case law. So if you have a dispute about 
some Guidelines calculation, you just lower the number in the 
waiver.109 
Findings from our sample indicated that a significant proportion of 
waivers were limited in these ways.110 
Table 9.  Agreements with Exemptions from Waiver That  
Limit Exposure 
Appeal Allowed If . . . % Cases with Waiver (n=619) 
Judge Departs Upward from Guidelines Range 36.5% (226) 
Sentence Exceeds Statutory Maximum 28.9% (179) 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 28.6% (177) 
Sentence Exceeds Specified Range 22.8% (141) 
Prosecutorial Misconduct/Brady Violation 18.1% (112) 
Government Appeals 13.2% (82) 
Sentence is “Illegal” 7.4% (46) 
Sentence Exceeds Specified Sentence 4.8% (30) 
Retroactive Application of Law 4.5% (28) 
Unconstitutional Statute 1.6% (10) 
No Limitations on Waiver 21.0% (130) 
c. Uncertainty and No Concessions for Some.  Despite the 
variety of concessions and terms tying down potential sentencing 
factors in many of these agreements, the interviews suggested that in 
some districts the concessions given in exchange for a defendant’s 
waiver were negligible, and the waivers were sweeping. Some 
defenders reported getting no stipulations, exemptions for certain 
 
 109. Telephone Interview with Defender #9; see also Telephone Interview with Defender #1 
(“[We a]lso have been successful in getting in exceptions for upward departures.”); Telephone 
Interview with Defender #2 (“When we pushed ‘em we could get the appeal waiver taken out, 
or we’d modify it. For example, we’d agree to everything except one issue, and exempt that one 
from the waiver. So we’d stip[ulate] to everything and agree to the waiver, but would be able to 
dispute that one issue, gave us some latitude.”). 
 110. See infra Table 9. Case law confirms that defendants who reserve issues for appeal in 
their appeal waivers sometimes benefit from doing so. See, e.g., United States v. Apodaca, 127 
F. App’x 726, 727 (5th Cir. 2005) (vacating a sentence because of trial judge error in departing 
upward, when upward departure was the only claim excepted from appeal waiver in plea 
agreement). 
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claims, sentencing discounts, or charging breaks in return for signing 
waivers. Reported one defender: “The offers they make[,] they don’t 
negotiate. The United States Attorney doesn’t see this as deserving 
extra consideration. Nothing additional is given. . . . ‘It’s our way or 
the highway.’”111 Some prosecutors reported giving no additional 
concessions, “If they don’t like the deal, they can plead open.”112 
Reported another, 
I’ve rarely seen a defense attorney bargain a waiver out of the 
agreement. Have I seen more stipulations as a result of the 
agreements? No, not really. There are big differences in the use of 
stipulations, but these are much more a function of the historical 
practice in a given district than whether or not there is a waiver in 
the agreement.113 
3. Licensing Misconduct or Lack of Care.  Several interviewees 
echoed the concern of critics that waivers, particularly those that 
forfeit collateral review, allow attorneys to insulate themselves from 
potential claims for misconduct related to the defendant’s case. This 
sort of agreement poses an obvious conflict of interest because 
barring the defendant from raising allegations of improper conduct is 
in the attorney’s self-interest. Consider this candid comment by one 
defender: “[F]rom the attorney’s standpoint[, waivers] do have the 
advantage of putting an end to it. It’s peace of mind, nice to know 
you’re not going to end up in two years arguing a 2255 [a collateral 
 
 111. Telephone Interview with Defender #5; see also Fant & Walker, supra note 53, at 60 
(“Although courts have touted appellate waivers as providing additional bargaining power for 
defendants during plea negotiations, the reality is that defendants have little power to refuse 
prosecutors’ demands for appellate waivers.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #16 (“[T]he 
government is not giving you more. I never had a case where the appeal waiver would make any 
difference in the deal. That’s not an experience I’ve had. To me it is something they put in to 
protect themselves from their own errors.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #7 (“[Q: Were 
the deals better after appeal waivers? A:] No, they know in 95% of the cases there are no issues 
to appeal. In my experience defendants in these cases have absolutely no bargaining power.”); 
Telephone Interview with Defender #13 (“The reality is unless we had a bargaining chip we’d 
have to go along.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #20 (“We didn’t ask [for benefits in 
return for the waivers]. We didn’t consider the benefits would be better. There may be some 
cases where we’re getting such a good deal that we would sign these, but not many.”); 
Telephone Interview with Defender #4 (“[Q: What more would you get for the waiver? A:] 
Nothing, really. Have to have an idea where your client will fall in the Guideline[s] range, have 
to be right. If not, good luck withdrawing the plea.”). 
 112. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #9. 
 113. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #6. 
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challenge, often based on ineffective assistance] . . . . It’s a harsh 
reality, but there it is.”114 
Claims of ineffective assistance and misconduct by the 
government may be excluded from waivers for this very reason.115 
Consider, for example, the provision discussed in United States v. 
Robinson,116 which included this caveat: 
provided however, . . . consistent with principles of professional 
responsibility imposed on [defense] counsel and counsel for the 
Government, [the defendant does] not waive his right to challenge 
his sentence to the extent that it is the result of a violation of his 
constitutional rights based on claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel or prosecutorial misconduct of constitutional dimension.117 
Of all agreements in our sample that included some sort of 
waiver, only about 30 percent exempted ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.118 Of all defendants in the sample who signed waivers, 
80 percent waived collateral review as well as appeal.119 Of those 
defendants waiving collateral review, only 32 percent reserved the 
right to raise ineffective assistance claims.120 Even fewer agreements 
excluded prosecutorial misconduct claims from waivers. 
This pattern might be related to early developments in appellate 
case law on the enforcement of waivers. Several early decisions stated 
that ineffective assistance of counsel claims could not be waived in 
plea agreements, and some courts still adhere to this position.121 
 
 114. Telephone Interview with Defender #21; see also Telephone Interview with Defender 
#7 (“It is a lot easier to explain to the client [that] there are no issues when there is an appeal 
waiver there.”). Defense attorneys do not escape appellate duties entirely when a client signs an 
appeal waiver. See United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1266–67 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
waiver does not foreclose all appellate review of [the] sentence. . . . If [the defendant] actually 
asked counsel to perfect an appeal, and counsel ignored the request, [the defendant] will be 
entitled to a delayed appeal.”). 
 115. Ineffective assistance claims are also the only claims exempted from the Attorney 
General’s mandatory waiver for fast-track cases. See Fast-Track Memo, supra note 48, at 3 
(“The defendant agrees to waive the opportunity to challenge his or her conviction under  
[§ 2255], except on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 
 116. 117 F. App’x 973 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 117. Id. at 974 (quoting the plea agreement). 
 118. See supra Table 9. 
 119. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 120. Of the 494 cases waiving collateral review, 158 exempted ineffective assistance claims. 
 121. E.g., United States v. Parra, 112 F. App’x 910, 911 (4th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) 
(considering an appeal after the first appeal was remanded for fact-finding on counsel’s conduct, 
despite a waiver); United States v. Carrion, 107 F. App’x 545, 546 (6th Cir. 2004) (reaching the 
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Following Blakely and Booker, however, appellate panels have 
enforced such waivers, so long as the claim of attorney error does not 
involve advice about the plea agreement itself, but instead relates to 
representation that occurred pre- or post-plea.122 
As the discussion above indicates, one concern with full blanket 
waivers is that attorneys will not be as careful as they should be if 
they know their past and future mistakes are protected from scrutiny. 
Additionally, some defenders interviewed worried that waivers lead 
judges to cut corners. Consider one defense attorney’s perception: 
There are unjustified Guidelines enhancements that I fight about 
with the judge, and you can see the judge, flipping back to the plea 
agreement, making sure that the appeal waiver is there, then looking 
you in the eye and denying everything. [Some] judges give 
significantly shorter shrift to what are complicated close arguments 
 
merits of a claim of ineffectiveness for failing to file an appeal despite an appeal waiver); see 
also, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #17 (“I told one judge that he’d have to appoint a 
separate counsel to advise the client before waiving that. He agreed [and] yelled at the 
government, and they had to take it out. You know so much of federal court practice is peculiar 
to the personality and views of individual district judges.”); supra note 68. 
 122. See, e.g., United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1156 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (collecting 
authority, but declining to decide the issue); United States v. Bowen, 121 F. App’x 569, 570 (5th 
Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (enforcing an appeal waiver to bar a claim of ineffectiveness at 
sentencing); Williams v. United States, 396 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (collecting authority 
from Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, holding that a waiver of the right to 
challenge a sentence collaterally includes a waiver of the right to raise a claim of ineffective 
assistance at sentencing, and noting that “a contrary result would permit a defendant to 
circumvent the terms of the sentence-appeal waiver simply by recasting a challenge to his 
sentence as a claim of ineffective assistance, thus rendering the waiver meaningless”); United 
States v. Price, 113 F. App’x 374, 376 (10th Cir. 2004) (refusing, because of a waiver, to consider 
a claim of ineffective assistance during the two weeks of trial before the defendant terminated 
the trial by pleading guilty, reasoning that “none of the alleged errors Defendant cites pertain to 
plea negotiations,” and that “poor previous trial performance [that] put [the defendant] in a 
position in which a plea was simply the best option. . . . is not the sort of argument which 
survives a waiver of post-conviction rights”); United States v. Monzon, 359 F.3d 110, 119 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (enforcing an appeal waiver when the defendant raised an ineffectiveness claim, 
noting that otherwise a defendant “could escape the fairly bargained-for appeal waiver by the 
simple expedient of asserting an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that had no merit”); 
United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187, 1188 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that 
collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that fall outside a challenge to 
the validity of the plea or waiver are waivable, and finding that the defendant’s claim that 
counsel was ineffective at sentencing did not relate to the validity of the plea or waiver); see also 
Braxton v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503 (W.D. Va. 2005) (“[M]otions claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel that do not relate directly to the validity of the plea or the  
§ 2255 waiver itself are waivable.”). 
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when they know they can’t be appealed. . . . It is not a good idea for 
judges to know that they are insulated from appeal.123 
Another defender offered, “[L]et’s face it, [judges] didn’t want to be 
reversed, [and] these waivers gave them a level of comfort.”124 Beyond 
anecdote, however, our study cannot shed light on the effect, if any, 
that appeal waivers might have on the level of care that judges devote 
to sentencing decisions. 
4. Illegal Sentences.  It is also difficult to test critics’ warnings 
that because of appeal waivers, serious error goes uncorrected.125 
More than half of the defense attorneys interviewed reported that 
some valid, nonfrivolous claims were turned away due to appeal 
waivers. Attorneys reported that waivers had blocked Guidelines 
issues concerning departures, ranges, and enhancements.126 “[T]he 
defendant had a twin brother,” recalled one defender, “and there 
were criminal history issues about whether the prior was related to 
this defendant or his brother, but there was an appeal waiver.”127 Case 
 
 123. Telephone Interview with Defender #9; see also Telephone Interview with Defender 
#14 (“Strategically, what we realized was that if a [Guidelines] issue arises at sentencing that was 
not anticipated by the parties, especially criminal history (this happens a lot), the judge is 
looking at the plea agreement that allows appeal by the government and not for the defense. 
Who is he going to rule for to avoid appeal? It creates a built-in bias.”); Telephone Interview 
with Defender #15 (“The [Pre-Sentence Report] comes in stamped ‘appeal waiver,’ and the 
judges will see that and just refuse to listen to arguments. The judge has to pay more attention if 
the appellate judges are looking over his shoulder.”). But cf. Telephone Interview with 
Defender #4 (“One judge says that he’s going to err on the side of the defense, he’s not a liberal 
soft judge, and resolve any close call in favor of the defendant because the defendant has no 
appeal.”); Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the 
Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 36 (1990) (arguing that “if the trial 
court also seeks to avoid reversal, the prohibition on government appeal of acquittals provides 
an incentive to make pro-defendant errors”); Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process and 
Adjudicator Incentives 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 10754, 2004), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10754 (“Where there is only one litigant who can 
make an appeal, the appeals process fails to alter adjudicator decisions if they would favor that 
litigant. Thus, the appeals process may have lower social value than where there are two 
opposing litigants.”). 
 124. Telephone Interview with Defender #7. For other comments on acceptance of waivers 
by trial judges, see supra note 54. 
 125. Carney, supra note 59, at 1032–33. 
 126. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #19 (reporting that defendants waive 
“scoring of enhancements, refusal to apply mitigators, [and] upward departures”); Telephone 
Interview with Defender #21 (relating cases in which waiver barred defendants from raising a 
double-counting problem and errors in calculating drug amount). 
 127. Telephone Interview with Defender #15. For another example, consider Telephone 
Interview with Defender #14: “I’ve tried to get around [the waiver] and argue the exception 
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law, too, suggests that the broadest waiver clauses bar claims that 
certain penalties violate statutes128 or the Constitution.129 Because 
those claims are not reviewed, however, it is not possible to 
determine whether relief would have been appropriate absent the 
waiver. And of course, the likelihood that sentences are based on 
false “facts” is greater when trial and appellate judges alike abandon 
scrutiny. 
As just one example of the type of serious error insulated from 
review by waivers, consider challenges to sentences under Apprendi 
v. New Jersey,130 Blakely, or Booker. Ten circuits held that once a 
defendant waives his right to appeal the sentence, that waiver blocks 
any claim that the sentence violated his rights under the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments.131 Other courts have also expressed this view, but 
as an alternative ground, or in cases that did not squarely present the 
 
applies when the judge sentenced within the range that he calculated, but it was the wrong 
range. Didn’t allow it.” 
 128. See, e.g., United States v. McAninch, 109 F. App’x 885, 886 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to 
address the defendant’s argument that a fine was authorized because “waiver includes the right 
to appeal all the forms of punishment listed in that statute, including fines”); United States v. 
Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 2000) (appeal may be barred by a waiver even “where 
the sentence was conceivably imposed in an illegal fashion or in violation of the Guidelines, 
but . . . within the range contemplated in the plea agreement”). But cf. United States v. Gordon, 
393 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2004) (reviewing a restitution order alleged to be erroneous under 
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, because if the restitution order is in excess of the 
statutory maximum penalty, it is illegal and the waiver of appeal is inapplicable); Telephone 
Interview with Defender #21 (“We can appeal an illegal sentence. Three years ago a judge 
restricted a guy’s access to the [I]nternet and the court of appeals said [the sentence] was illegal 
because the [probation] condition was bad. It’s a way around the waiver.”). 
 129. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 953 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a waiver 
barred the right to argue that facts should have been established by a clear and convincing 
evidence standard). 
 130. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 131. United States v. Morgan, 406 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Lockett, 406 
F.3d 207, 214 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 153 (4th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 170–71 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 546 
(5th Cir. 2005); United States v. McKinney, 406 F.3d 744, 746–47 (5th Cir. 2005); United States 
v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459, 463 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th 
Cir. 2005); United States v. Parsons, 396 F.3d 1015, 1017–18 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), 
vacated on other grounds, 408 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cardenas, 405 F.3d 1046, 
1048 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1142–43 (10th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rubbo, 396 F.3d 
1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2005). But see United States v. Henderson, 135 F. App’x 858, 862–63 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (finding that although the defendant expressly waived the right to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Guidelines or the Guidelines sentence, Booker error was not waived, 
and remanding for resentencing under an advisory system). 
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issue.132 No circuit has expressly exempted claims under Blakely or 
Booker from waivers. 
If sentencing error remains uncorrected because of waiver 
clauses, three types of harm may result. First, defendants barred by 
their waivers from raising valid claims may be punished illegally in 
violation of a statute or the Constitution—that is, punished more 
severely than they otherwise would have been had they not signed 
appeal waivers but had instead pursued appellate relief for the error 
in their cases. However, many defendants receive significant 
advantages by signing the waivers, advantages that for these 
defendants might outweigh or exceed any potential relief that 
preserving a valid claim might have yielded.133 By signing a waiver, 
defendants gamble that the deals they have negotiated are better than 
the dispositions they might ultimately receive if they preserved their 
right to review. Some win this bet, others do not. Because not all 
defendants barred from waiving a valid claim by their plea 
agreements suffer as a result of the waiver, there is no basis for 
claiming that waivers are, for example, more likely than not to lead to 
excessive punishment for defendants. We simply do not know what 
proportion of defendants end up worse off because of their waivers. 
Second, gaps in enforcement created by appeal waivers pose an 
additional risk unrelated to the interest of the defendant or the 
prosecutor. If prosecutors are negotiating (and judges are approving) 
lower sentences in cases with waivers to avoid the trouble of appeal, 
the sentences that result may be more lenient than what either 
Congress or the Commission had authorized. Defendants may be 
receiving substantial sentencing discounts for a reason—to avoid 
 
 132. See United States v. Sahlin, 399 F.3d 27, 32–33 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that the 
defendant’s claim that the judge should have found the predicate facts for the enhancement by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was foreclosed by stipulation to the application of the 
enhancement); United States v. West, 392 F.3d 450, 460–61 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting a Blakely 
claim and enforcing a waiver clause in the defendant’s plea agreement because the defendant 
failed to provide a reason not to, but expressly declining to decide whether such waivers are 
valid as a general matter). 
 133. Consider this explanation by Prosecutor #6: 
Is it a contract of adhesion, is it unfair that we are demanding an awful lot but not 
giving up much? Yes, you could argue that. But we don’t have to give up anything, 
and as a matter of judicial efficiency it makes sense. Especially when the sentences 
are high, who is to say that agreeing to 45 years instead of life is wrong or an 
inappropriate punishment? And if you ask is the defendant benefiting from the 
agreement, is it still, even with the waiver, an agreement that inures to the benefit of 
the defendant in the end? Yeah, it is, that’s why they sign the agreement at all. Is 
there a real benefit the defendant is getting? Yes. 
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appeals—that neither Congress nor the Commission has endorsed as 
a basis for imposing lower sentences. With so much attention devoted 
to regulating unauthorized leniency under the Guidelines, it is rather 
remarkable that the trading of sentencing discounts for appeal 
waivers has gone unnoticed. 
Finally, appeal waivers may also hide from view the extent of 
uneven application of the law regulating the criminal process. When 
appellate correction is bought and sold in some cases but not others, 
Congress, the Commission, and the courts that develop and interpret 
sentencing law are left with an incomplete picture of the extent and 
frequency of compliance. This concern is addressed below in  
Section 6. 
5. Bargaining Savvy.  Interviews turned up another interesting 
pattern that has not been raised by current critics of appeal waivers. 
Many interviewees reported that compared with less-experienced 
attorneys, repeat players from federal defender offices get better 
deals in return for waivers and are more likely to avoid waivers by 
counseling their clients to reject plea agreements and plead guilty to 
the indictment “blind.”134 Explained one defender: 
The economics are quite different for the private and CJA attorneys 
[attorneys appointed under the Criminal Justice Act]—they are 
thrilled to have no appeal, because they won’t get paid for it, and the 
CJA attorneys are trial attorneys at heart. They don’t relish appeals 
either. The [United States Attorneys] will tell you they get waivers 
in every case, and they are getting more of them in the cases 
represented outside this office. . . . They backed down on the appeal 
waiver [with us] but have made headway with the private lawyers.135 
 
 134. See Telephone Interview with Defender #4 (“[T]he retained attorneys don’t know what 
they are doing. . . . I’ve seen two occasions where the judge made the wrong ruling and the 
defendant had no recourse . . . [T]hey were panel attorney cases.”). 
 135. Telephone Interview with Defender #19; see also Telephone Interview with Defender 
#8 (“[Q: What percentage of plea agreements do you think have appeal waivers in your district? 
A:] Two to five percent or so, no more, doesn’t happen that often. Private counsel do it all the 
time. . . . They don’t know doodly about the Guidelines, they get a deal, they go for it. They 
don’t realize [that] fewer charges doesn’t lower [the] sentence.”); Telephone Interview with 
Defender #1 (“I know there are a lot of panel attorneys with less experience in the federal 
system who are eating appeal waivers when they shouldn’t. They don’t have these waivers in the 
state system.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #3 (“A fair number really don’t know what 
they’re doing, don’t know if they are getting anything in return for the appeal waiver.”); 
Telephone Interview with Defender #9 (“[T]he panel attorneys and private attorneys . . . [will] 
sign anything, but my policy was if [you’re] not going to plead to a lesser, or [get] something in 
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Several prosecutors confirmed that “repeat customers may be 
more resistant than others. . . . [There are s]ome who bargain 
harder.”136 Reported one prosecutor: 
A CJA attorney will say, “[W]ell this is part of every plea 
agreement, I might as well sign it, I’ve got to get ready for trial in my 
civil case anyway.” Defenders are different. They have no other 
sorts of cases. They look at these and say, “I can litigate this.” They 
can give it more thought at the time.137 
Some defenders’ offices have even negotiated with the United States 
Attorney in their districts to narrow the language in boilerplate 
appeal waivers.138 Unfortunately, information about whether a 
defendant was represented by a federal defender, panel attorney, or 
retained counsel was missing from the Commission data in 73 percent 
of the cases in our sample, so we could not test the accuracy of 
interviewees’ reports of better deals for those represented by federal 
defenders. 
That defense attorney savvy and influence might make a 
difference is not exactly headline news. But it is a reminder that 
variations in the quality of defense counsel will impede any system 
that hopes to reduce, rather than exacerbate, disparity in sentencing 
among similarly situated offenders.139 
6. Law Distortion.  That brings us to the last objection to appeal 
waivers—their potential to distort the law. Waivers may hide 
violations of certain rules more often than violations of other rules, 
hide violations in certain jurisdictions more often than in other 
jurisdictions, and hide error in certain types of cases more often than 
 
the deal, don’t sign the plea agreement.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #10 (stating that 
his office will not sign agreements with waivers except in Rule 11(c)(1)(C) cases, and that “the 
cases with waivers that did get to the courts were by panel attorneys”); Telephone Interview 
with Defender #15 (“If they see one of these, they wouldn’t know what it was. We have more 
understanding about these.”). 
 136. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #1. 
 137. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #6. 
 138. Telephone Interview with Defender #5. 
 139. A similar point is made by Professor Margareth Etienne, in her article, Parity, 
Disparity, and Adversariality: First Principles of Sentencing, 58 STAN L. REV. 309, 321 (2005) 
(“A tremendous knowledge gap currently exists between federal public defenders and private 
lawyers, many of whom understand little about the intricate Guidelines. This knowledge gap . . . 
leads to a disparity in sentencing outcomes among defendants. . . . [A] sentencing system that 
unnecessarily magnifies these differences should be avoided.”). 
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in other types of cases. All bargaining skews appellate lawmaking 
because rules that survive the bargaining process receive attention 
and development that rules waived as part of bargains do not. For 
most legal rules, we accept that parties will bargain in the shadow of 
the few cases that do reach judicial decision, and that some rules will 
be enforced less vigorously in some cases than in others. But 
sentencing rules are premised explicitly upon the goal of minimizing 
disparity between cases. Blind spots of enforcement are more costly 
when the very reason for the regulation being traded away 
inconsistently is consistency itself.140 
Critics have worried that waivers hide from view bargaining 
practices in some jurisdictions but not others.141 Even within the same 
circuit, the proportion of cases with waivers varies greatly from 
district to district. Table 10 shows the frequency of waivers for the 
eight districts that had at least twenty cases in the sample. Cases 
settled by plea agreement appear to be almost entirely insulated from 
review in some districts, whereas in other districts appeal waivers are 
the exception, not the rule. For example, our sample contained sixty 
cases from each of two adjoining districts in Texas; in one district over 
93 percent of the agreements had waivers; in the other only 30 
percent did. 
Given the marked differences in the use of waivers, it is likely 
that the mix of sentencing issues that reach the courts of appeals from 
the Southern District of California (with 5.4 percent of offenders, but 
only 3.1 percent of appeals during FY 2003) might be different from 
the mix that rises out of the Southern District of Texas (with 7.2 
percent of offenders and 8.5 percent of appeals during FY 2003). 
 
 140. See United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 570–80 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J., 
concurring specially) (arguing that, like waiving the statutory right to a speedy trial, which 
offends the goals of the Speedy Trial Act, waiving the right to sentencing in accordance with the 
Guidelines offends the systematic goals reflected in the Guidelines); Nancy Jean King, Priceless 
Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 132 (1999) 
(“[R]egulating waiver makes sense as a means to protect public or third-party interests that are 
advanced by the government’s adherence to procedural requirements. Regulation of the waiver 
of a potentially nonnegotiable right must be tailored to the specific third-party or public 
interests that the right protects.”); cf. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 401 (1987) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment, casting the fifth vote) (stating that the 
enforcement of release-dismissal agreements, in which a defendant agrees to release authorities 
from civil liability in return for dismissal of charges, requires proof that the agreement is in the 
public interest). But cf. infra note 151. 
 141. See Telephone Interview with Defender #9 (“And the other thing that is bad is that 
sentencing law in this circuit is made by cases out of [names a different location]. There are no 
appeals from here.”). 
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Unfortunately, without further analysis using appellate data, we do 
not have enough information to attribute lower rates of appeal, or 
differences in issues appealed, directly to higher rates of waiver. 
Table 10.  Districts with 20 or More Cases in Sample 
District 
% Cases 
from 
District 
with 
Waivers 
% Cases from  
Dist. Trafficking / 
Immigration (Total)
Of Cases from Dist. 
In FY 2003, % Traf. 
/ Immig. (Total) 
Of Cases 
FY 2003, 
% from 
Dist. 
% 
Appeals 
FY 2003, 
from Dist. 
P.R. 3.7% 74.1% / 3.7% 
(77.8%) 
64.6% / 9.0% 
(73.6%) 
1.2% 1.0% 
E.D.N.Y.^ 70.4% 48.1% / 7.4% 
(55.5%) 
42.9% / 6.7% 
(49.6%) 
2.7% 1.9% 
S.D. Fla. 445.0% 62.5% / 7.5% 
(70.0%) 
43.5% / 19.7% 
(63.2%) 
3.3% 3.9% 
S.D. 
Tex.*^ 
30.0% 48.3% / 45.0% 
(93.3%) 
34.2% / 53.8% 
(88.0%) 
7.2% 8.5% 
W.D. Tex* 93.3% 76.7% / 10.0% 
(86.7%) 
52.5% / 32.3% 
(84.8%) 
7.2% 6.7% 
D. Ariz.*^ 97.7% 13.3% / 62.5% 
(75.5%) 
21.2% / 53.4% 
(74.6%) 
6.5% 2.8% 
C.D. Cal.* 95.7% 21.7% / 13.0% 
(44.7%) 
17.6% / 19.0% 
(36.6%) 
2.6% 4.6% 
S.D. 
Cal.*^ 
100.0% 35.1% / 56.8% 
(91.9%) 
28.3% / 54.2% 
(82.5%) 
5.4% 3.1% 
* denotes fast-track immigration program. 
^ denotes fast-track drug trafficking program.142 
Another concern is that waiver may insulate from review 
sentencing issues for particular types of offenses. Because 
Department of Justice policy mandates waivers for fast-track 
dispositions, it is not surprising that immigration and drug trafficking 
 
 142. See generally Memorandum from James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Authorization of Early Disposition Programs (Oct. 29, 2004), appended to 
Government’s Memo, supra note 48 (listing districts with fast-track programs and describing 
each program). Although the fast-track programs noted in Table 10 were officially authorized 
during the sample period, many, like the fast track in the Southern District of California, had 
been in existence for the entire sample period (FY 2003). After the sample period ended, 
additional fast-track programs were approved for drug trafficking in the Western District of 
Texas and for false immigration documents in the Southern District of Florida, but these are not 
noted above. See id. 
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cases appear more likely to contain waivers than the other two most 
prevalent categories of federal felonies. Yet as Table 10 
demonstrates, any pattern of waiver use that rises as the proportion of 
immigration and drug cases rises is not uniform at the district level. 
The likelihood of waivers does not appear to correspond directly to 
the proportion of the district’s caseload devoted to drug trafficking or 
immigration cases. 
More importantly, based on 2003 data, the two offense categories 
with the highest incidence of waivers in our sample—drug trafficking 
and immigration—seem to make up a slightly larger proportion of the 
appeals than they do cases sentenced.143 Fraud cases, with a waiver 
rate lower than either trafficking or immigration, comprise a lower 
proportion of appeals, not higher. This comparison of waiver rates 
and appeals by district and offense type, although simplistic, fails to 
support claims of waiver critics that waivers are choking off review for 
entire districts or types of offenses. 
Table 11.  Waivers and Appeals by Crime Type 
Crime Type 
Of Sample Cases of 
Type, % with Waiver
Of Cases FY 2003, 
% of This Type 
Of Appeals FY 2003, 
% of Type 
Drug Trafficking 62.3% 35.7% 41.4% 
Fraud 60.4% 10.7% 8.2% 
Immigration 71.6% 21.6% 22.1% 
Firearms 53.7% 9.8% 10.5% 
Note: Source for data in last two columns is Commission FY 2003 Statistical Report, 
Tables 3 and 61. 
A final concern has been that waivers are essentially one-sided, 
which leads to another sort of distortion in the development of 
appellate sentencing law.144 As Table 12 shows, we found that very 
few waivers are mutual.145 This has not, however, translated into a 
 
 143. See infra Table 11. 
 144. See, e.g., United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 46 (D.D.C. 1997) (stating that 
unilateral waivers “undermine the statutory balance” created when both sides were given access 
to appellate review). 
 145. However, not all trial judges allow one-sided waivers, according to some interviewees. 
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #6 (“[O]ne case where the United States tried to 
get one without waiving itself, and [the judge] rejected [it], order[ed] them to do it over.”); 
Telephone Interview with Defender #13 (“After [the new United States attorney] came in [one 
assistant U.S. attorney] started asking for waivers by the defendant with no waiver by [the] 
government. [The] judge refused to accept it.”). Compare United States v. Calderon, 388 F.3d 
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change in the balance between defense- and government-initiated 
sentencing appeals. Government appeals have always been few and 
far between compared to defense appeals; this disparity may be 
partially explained by the requirement that prosecutors seek 
supervisory approval prior to any appeal.146 
Table 12.  Party Waiving 
 % Cases with Waiver (n=616) 
Defendant Only 87.0% (536) 
Defendant & United States 12.5%* (77) 
United States Only 0.5% (3) 
* Of these 77 cases, 19 (24.4 percent) are from the Central District of 
California and 8 (10.2 percent) are from the District of Arizona. No other district 
with 20 or more cases in our sample had mutual waivers. 
Based on this limited study, the safest conclusion to draw about 
the distorting influence of waivers on the development of sentencing 
doctrine in the courts of appeals is that we have not seen evidence 
that waivers have changed the balance of appeals between parties. 
Nor does this study support the conclusion that waivers have 
precluded appeals by defendants convicted of certain offenses or 
from certain districts. Waivers may affect the issues that appeals 
courts address, but we cannot confirm or refute this without 
additional research. 
CONCLUSION 
Appeal waivers are firmly entrenched in plea agreement practice 
in federal courts. By adopting deferential reasonableness review, the 
Court in Booker has reduced the value of appeal waivers to 
prosecutors. But waivers still hold value and are not likely to fade 
away. Already the language of clauses in some districts has been 
changed to respond to the new post-Booker regime by including an 
express waiver of review for reasonableness.147 More importantly, 
 
197, 200 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting an argument that enforcing a defense waiver in light of the 
government’s right to appeal was unfair) with United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 n.5 (4th 
Cir. 2005) (noting an earlier decision holding that whenever a defendant waives the right to 
appeal in a plea agreement, the government has a reciprocal obligation not to appeal). 
 146. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) (2000). 
 147. Prosecutor #4 commented: 
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waivers are proving their worth to prosecutors by deflecting Booker 
claims on appeal,148 and they will continue to insulate sentences from 
attack should the Court later expand the Apprendi rule to include 
findings of prior convictions or facts necessary to mandatory 
minimum sentences, consecutive sentences, forfeitures, or restitution 
orders.149 With the constitutional regulation of sentencing statutes 
uncertain, prosecutors and courts will turn to appeal waivers to 
maximize finality. 
Rather than count on appellate review as a means of assuring 
consistent application of sentencing law, reformers should assume 
that in most felony cases in which the parties enter into agreements, 
appellate review of the sentence is simply not available. At best, 
appellate review enforces sentencing consistency in only a minority of 
federal cases—cases that go to trial, cases in which the defendant 
pleads open with no agreement, and cases in which the defendant is 
able to resist signing an appeal waiver. At worst, widespread 
bargaining over waivers has turned appellate review into a bargaining 
chip, increasing, rather than decreasing, sentencing disparity. 
Appellate review is as likely to be traded for sentencing concessions 
as it is to deter or correct sentencing error. Reform should go 
forward, then, with serious skepticism about the ability of appellate 
review to ensure consistent sentencing practices. 
The obvious question is whether it makes sense to regulate the 
exchange of waivers for charge and sentence concessions. At least 
two options present themselves, each with its own drawbacks. The 
first alternative would be for courts to refuse to enforce waivers on 
 
[D]istrict judges are putting pressure on the Department of Justice to get the 
defendant to agree that any sentence within the Guidelines is reasonable. . . . It would 
make some sense to include a stipulation that the sentence is a reasonable sentence 
for all purposes under 3553(a)—a Booker waiver, but we aren’t doing that. We’d have 
to decide whether a defendant could waive the constitutional rule in Booker. It’s the 
next logical step. We do see some judges asking for this. 
Another prosecutor reported that each agreement now includes a clause which reads, “The 
defendant and the United States agree that any sentence that falls within the appropriate 
Guidelines range, as determined by the probation office, . . . is per se reasonable and not an 
abuse of discretion.” Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #6. 
 148. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 149. See, e.g., United States v. Fruchter, 411 F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 2005) (collecting 
authority rejecting the application of Apprendi and Blakely to criminal forfeiture); see also 
Brian Kleinhaus, Note, Serving Two Masters: Evaluating the Criminal or Civil Nature of the 
VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Abatement Doctrine, and 
the Sixth Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2711, 2755–59 (2005) (discussing application of 
Blakely to restitution). 
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policy grounds. Prohibition would maximize the goal of sentencing 
consistency; once deprived of value, waivers would cease to be 
traded. The interest in maximizing the uniformity of sentences for 
like offenders is not represented by the attorneys at the bargaining 
table in criminal cases. If sentencing law is to trump the preferences 
of parties, and not merely to serve as an opening bid, then courts 
must enforce it, despite waiver. Policy must serve as the basis for 
refusal to enforce waivers, because at present any constitutional or 
statutory prohibition of waivers is unlikely. The Court’s precedent is 
not likely to support a constitutional ban on the waiver of sentencing 
appeals. If a defendant can waive the right to a jury trial, then surely, 
proponents have argued, defendants can choose to waive statutory 
rights to appellate review of their sentences.150 To read current federal 
statutes as prohibiting waivers is also a stretch.151 
Of course, as Congress considers new sentencing legislation in 
the wake of Booker, it could choose to mandate appellate review of 
every sentence, or prohibit appeal waivers entirely,152 but it would be 
difficult for legislators to deny prosecutors and courts the finality and 
fiscal relief that appeal waivers afford. Already, Congress has opted 
for efficiency over consistency in authorizing fast-track programs, for 
example. For waiver proponents, banning waivers would mean 
abandoning a handy way to encourage the speedy disposition of 
criminal cases, regardless of whether the ban is based in constitutional 
law, statutory command, or sentencing policy. There is no easy 
solution to reconciling the efficient administration of justice with the 
need to ensure uniform sentencing, but the need for such 
reconciliation will continue to be at the very heart of sentencing 
policy for years to come. 
 
 150. See cases collected supra note 46. 
 151. See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 117 (2000) (upholding the waiver of the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers (IAD) timing provisions and noting that (1) the Court has allowed the 
waiver of numerous constitutional protections for criminal defendants that also serve broader 
social interests; (2) in general, those social or public interests are protected by the participants in 
the litigation; and (3) the time provisions of the IAD are not so central to the statute that they 
are “part of the unalterable ‘statutory policy’“). In supporting its conclusion that the provisions 
of the IAD may be waived, the Court in Hill also pointed out that unlike the time limits of the 
Speedy Trial Act, which run automatically without request of the defendant, IAD time limits 
are triggered only by a request of one of the parties. Id. at 117 n.2. Notably, appellate review of 
noncapital sentencing also requires a request of one of the parties. 
 152. Professor Chanenson has suggested that “Congress should statutorily eliminate 
sentence appeal waivers.” Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance From Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. 
L. REV. 175, 182 (2005). 
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An entirely different approach to regulating this market would 
be to attempt to standardize the price of appeal waivers instead of 
driving that price to zero. Critics might observe that efforts to 
standardize another process discount—the sentencing break 
defendants receive for waiving trial—have not been particularly 
successful.153 Parties continue to set the price of a trial higher than (or 
the discount for a plea deeper than) the three points allocated by the 
Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility whenever they have the 
leverage to do so.154 And it is the absence of any enforceable ceiling 
on the penalty gap between plea sentences and trial sentences that 
most troubles commentators, who worry that even an innocent 
defendant will plead guilty and accept a moderate penalty rather than 
risk conviction and a sentence many times greater. A similar inability 
to constrain the amount of discount would plague any attempt by 
Congress or the Commission to set a price for appeal waivers. 
Yet even though the Guidelines have been ineffective in setting a 
ceiling on the price of the waiver of trial, they have changed 
bargaining by setting a floor—an opening bid. The waiver of appeal 
presently has no similar pricing norm deliberately selected as part of 
nationwide policy. Some defendants who waive review rights get 
nothing in return. It is possible, then, that simply recognizing a going 
rate might have some tendency to improve the consistency of federal 
sentencing. 
Inevitably, though, any minimum, legislatively endorsed price tag 
on the right to appeal would be challenged as an unconstitutional 
penalty on the exercise of the statutory rights to direct and collateral 
review.155 The Guidelines plea discount—“acceptance of 
responsibility”—has withstood constitutional challenge as a trial 
penalty because it is easy to justify as related to the purposes of 
punishment and sentencing philosophy. Pleading guilty can be recast 
 
 153. See, e.g., Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in 
Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 959, 961 n.4 (2005) (collecting authority). 
 154. See FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 30 (“Department [of Justice] policies 
allow prosecutors to invoke statutory minimum penalties and statutory enhancements as further 
incentives for guilty pleas, even barring their declination or dismissal except as part of a plea 
agreement.”). 
 155. Although there is no constitutional right to appeal, the Supreme Court has held that 
imposing a higher sentence as a penalty for exercising the right to appeal violates due process. 
See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, at § 26.8 (discussing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 
711 (1969), and the cases that followed). 
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as feeling guilty without raising too many eyebrows, and a defendant 
who feels guilty is arguably in need of less punishment than one who 
denies his responsibility for the crime and demands that the 
government prove his guilt. Even snitches who receive lesser 
sentences for helping to prosecute others are arguably exhibiting a 
greater earnestness about becoming law-abiding citizens than those 
who could rat on their pals but choose not to.156 By contrast, 
defendants who waive all of their rights to seek appellate correction 
of any future constitutional and statutory errors that may occur at 
sentencing are no less culpable or easier to rehabilitate than 
defendants who do not waive these rights. Defendants who receive 
discounts for appeal waivers may simply be opportunists, sacrificing 
whatever the prosecutor wants (here, a free pass on any future law 
violations) so long as it means less punishment. 
These are only a few of the issues policymakers will encounter as 
they consider how to take account of the increasingly pervasive use of 
appeal waivers in federal cases. A full evaluation of the various 
options for regulating waivers is beyond the scope of this initial 
study.157 But hopefully, that evaluation will no longer be based entirely 
on blind speculation about what waivers say, who signs them, in what 
cases, and for what concessions. Ideally, the glimpse into appeal 
waiver practice provided by this limited study will not be the last, and 
the Commission will begin to collect basic information about appeal 
waivers and their effects on federal sentencing. 
Even if the Commission continues to ignore waivers in its data 
collection practices, there are reasons to expect that scholars will soon 
begin to fill the void. A new rule has been proposed that will require 
all districts (not just a handful of pilot districts) to post all unsealed 
documents filed in criminal cases on PACER, the searchable online 
 
 156. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into 
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J., 85, 135 (discussing “the moral side of cooperation”). 
 157. Other creative proposals exist, including the suggestion that groups of defendants 
coordinate their bargaining positions to gain leverage, like unions. See Donald A. Dripps, 
Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 1155, 1177–79 (2005) (discussing strategies for limiting the defendant’s right to waiver). 
Indeed, as illustrated by some of the interviewees’ comments, see supra notes 135–138 and 
accompanying text, some federal defender offices have been able to negotiate default waiver 
policies applicable to all the defendants represented by the office, using leverage that private 
defenders lack. 
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database for federal courts.158 Internet access to actual plea 
agreements in federal cases nationwide has the potential to support a 
new generation of empirical evaluation of bargaining practices.159 
Finally, although this study has evaluated waivers of review in 
federal cases, there are lessons here for the states. As states consider 
more rigorous appellate review of increasingly detailed sentencing 
rules, the experience in the federal system should furnish a cautionary 
tale. The more closely that sentencing is regulated by appeal, the 
more likely it is that appellate review will be traded as part of plea 
negotiations, creating an additional source of sentencing disparity 
between those who are able to extract sentencing concessions for 
waivers, and those who are not. 
 
 158. Memorandum from Professor Sara Sun Beale, Consultant, to Members, Criminal Rules 
Advisory Comm., Proposed New Rule 49.1, to Implement E-Government Act (Mar. 15, 2005) 
(on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 159. PACER research will always be an imperfect substitute for Commission analysis, 
however, because only the Commission has access to the case identification information that can 
link information from PACER to the detailed sentencing information coded into the 
Commission’s many data sets (which are unavailable on PACER itself). The PACER database 
is available online at http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/. 
